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PENALTIES AND REMEDIES UNDERTHE COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT
1889-1976
By W. T. STANBURY*
A. INTRODUCTION
A recent issue of the New Yorker featured a cartoon which epitomizes
public reaction to violations of the Combines Investigation Act.1 A middle-
aged, portly executive stands before a judge. The judge, gavel in hand,
delivers the verdict and pronounces sentence:
Warrington Trently, this court has found you guilty of price-fixing, bribing a
government official, and conspiring to act in restraint of trade. I sentence you to
six months in jail, suspended. You will now step forward for the ceremonial
tapping of the wrist.2
During the first eighty-five years following the enactment of the Com-
bines Investigation Act, or its predecessor statutes, not one individual was
sentenced to jail for an offence in restraint of trade. In fact, few were ever
charged. In the past two years, four individuals have been imprisoned; one
offender for a term of one year and three others for one day each. 3 All were
convicted of misleading advertising rather than for some large-scale, multi-
year price fixing scheme.
The central proposition of this article is that, with very few exceptions,
the penalties in combines cases have been grossly inadequate for the purpose
either of deterring the repetition of the offence or deterring others who may
contemplate similar illegal restraints of trade. In fact, a careful review of the
fines in such cases would almost certainly result in the conclusion that "crime
pays." This proposition is not new, but the purpose of this paper is to docu-
ment the argument and to suggest some practical reforms which would deter
illegal restraints of trade.
© Copyright, 1976, W. T. Stanbury.
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I R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
2 New Yorker, July 5, 1976 at 29.
3 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act,
(hereafter referred to as Report of the Director), March 31, 1975, (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1975) at 41. The trial judge in the former case gave a sentence of two years,
but this was reduced on appeal (May 14, 1975).
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In 1956, the fines in combines cases were most aptly described by Rand,J., in Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen where he
stated that "the procedure of enforcement by conviction and fine has tended
to exhibit a course of things bearing a close likeness to periodic licensing of
illegality."4 He went on to state that unless the sanctions under the Act were
made more effective they would enable "self-confessed lawlessness to set the
will of Parliament at defiance."5 This case involved a charge under s. 498(1)(d)
of the Criminal Code in which the accused pleaded guilty to a nation-wide
conspiracy in industrial mechanical rubber goods that extended over seven-
teen years (1935-1952). For such an offence, a guilty party could only be
subject to a maximum fine of $10,000. At the Ontario Court of Appeal,
Roach, J.A. stated that the combine "had complete control of the mechanical
branch of the trade throughout the Dominion," that it was "exhaustive in its
scope" and that "its manipulations were continued even after the indictment
down to the opening date of the trial." More recently, Peter C. Newman has
observed:
The effectiveness of past combines prosecutions has been fatally weakened by the
insignificance of fines imposed. In January, 1958, for instance, eleven shingle
manufacturers paid the courts the maximum fine of $10,000 each for having
operated a combine in the $30-million-a-year asphalt-roofing industry since 1932.7
Frank Howard (NDP, Skeena) pointed out that when the Dominion
Steel and Coal Corporation was fined $10,000 in 1956, it amounted to three-
twentieths of one per cent of the net profit of the firm in 1956. "[If the fine
were spread over the twenty year period of the conspiracy the amount would
be even more infinitesimal." He went on to assert that such fines "are nothing
more than a licensing fee to operate illegally." s
By mid-1976, the largest fine ever levied on a single firm for a single
count in a combines case in Canada was $125,000 in R. v. Armco Canada
Ltd.0 and R. v. Ocean Construction Supplies Ltd.10 In the latter case, which
involved three separate conspiracies, Ocean Construction Supplies paid a total
of $220,000 in fines. Following the sentence, the Vancouver Sun editorialized
that [tihe public may be less impressed by the size of the fines in the cement
price-fixing case than by the fact that none of the persons who operated the
illegal ring were charged with the offence, much less convicted."
4 [1956] S.C.R. 303 at 311; 2 D.L.R. (2d) 11 at 13; 114 C.C.C. 380 at 382; 26
C.P.R. 1 at 3.
51d. at 312 (S.C.R.); 13 (D.L.R.); 382 (C.C.C.); 3 (C.P.R.).
6 [19541 O.R. 377 at 396; 4 D.L.R. 61 at 71; 18 C.R. 245 at 255; 108 C.C.C. 321
at 333; O.W.N. 436.
7 Peter C. Newman, The Canadian Establishment (Vol. 1, Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart Ltd., 1975) at 157.
8 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1960 at 4376 (May 31, 1960).
9 8 O.R. (2d) 573 at 580; (1975), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 147 at 153; 19 C.P.R. 273 at 279.
10 (1974), 15 C.P.R. (2d) 224 (sentence) and (1975), 18 C.P.R. (2d) 166 (appeal
on sentence), (hereafter referred to as B.C. Cement). In R. v. K. C. Irving (1974), 22
C.C.C. (2d) 281 the trial court imposed fines totalling $150,000 on the various Irving
enterprises. The verdict was reversed on appeal, (1975), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 479, and was
given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
1 March 13, 1974 at 4.
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George Stigler et al., in their review of the U.S. antitrust laws remarked:
The cutting edge of law is not the abstract statement of a legal duty but the
sanction provided for its non-performance, and that is true of the antitrust laws
as of other systems of legal obligation. 12
In Canada, the cutting edge of the law as it relates to restraints of trade has
been dull. Any rational, calculating businessman would not be deterred by the
size of the fines (and legal costs) given the benefits of fixing prices, engaging
in resale price maintenance or merging with competitors and the low proba-
bility of being convicted.
B. REMEDIES OTHER THAN FINES AND IMPRISONMENT
The Combines Investigation Act, its predecessors and the relevant sec-
tions of the Criminal Code have provided for a range of penalties and reme-
dies. In order to put the actual penalties, into perspective it may be useful to
examine briefly the full spectrum of penalties available to the judiciary in re-
straint of trade cases in Canada. There are now six formally defined penalties
or remedies:
1) fines and/or imprisonment
2) reduction or removal of tariffs
3) voiding or amending a patent or trademark or the terms of a licence of a
patent or trademark
4) prohibition orders (conduct remedies)
5) structural remedies with respect to merger and monopoly cases
6) recovery of single damages plus costs in civil actions
In addition, there is one informal penalty/remedy in which the early framers
of combines legislations placed great faith - publicity.
1. Publicity
Before looking at the formal penalties/remedies as set out in the Act, it
may be useful to recall the emphasis formerly placed on the non-statutory
'penalty' of publicity. Mackenzie King, following the approach of his Industrial
Disputes Investigation Act,'3 was a great believer in "the power of informed
public opinion." In introducing the first Combines Investigation Act in 1910 as
Minister of Labour (the Department then responsible for its administration)
he argued that "light is the sovereign antiseptic and the best of all police-
men."' 4 He went on to state that the Act would provide machinery "which
will enable an intelligent public opinion to be formed and focused on a parti-
12 Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition (George J. Stigler,
Chairman) as reprinted in (1969) 2 Antitrust Law & Economics Rev., No. 3. Spring,
1969, 13-52 at 32.
13 R.S.C. 1907, c. 20.
14 Cited in L.A. Skeoch (ed.), Restrictive Trade Practices In Canada (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1966) at 26.
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cular evil which you are endeavoring to stamp out. Penalties are frequently
of no service toward that end."' 5 Rather than drag business executives before
the courts following a regular criminal investigation, King proposed that six
citizens be allowed to make application to a judge for an order directing an
investigation into the alleged combine, which at that time included mergers,
trusts and monopolies as well as the more common horizontal conspiracies.
The Report of the Macquarrie Committee in 1952 describes the procedures:
If, after a hearing, the judge found the situation to warrant an inquiry he could
issue an order to that effect. The Minister of Labour was then to appoint a board
of three commissioners, one selected by the applicants, one by the parties against
whom the application was made, and the third, the chairman, who was to be a
judge, nominated by the other two members. A board had power to compel the
attendance of witnesses, examine them under oath, require the production of
documents and general incidental powers to carry out a full inquiry.
A board had wide powers of report; it could make "such findings and recommen-
dations as, in the opinion of the board, are in accordance with the merits and
requirements of the case." Reports were to be transmitted to the Minister at the
conclusion of an inquiry and to be published in the Canada Gazette.16
This special investigatory procedure for combines offences reflected
MacKenzie King's reluctance to brand "as criminals any body of men joined
together for commercial purposes before you find out whether or not they
have been guilty of a criminal offence.. ."17 It is important to note that King's
reluctance (and that of Parliament) did not extend to car thieves or bank
robbers. King went on to state that the Act "does not propose to place those
parties in the position of defendants in a criminal court, but treats them as
persons whose business for a time being is being examined or a bank to see
whether or not it is being carried on in a fair and proper manner."' 8
The publicity attendant on the investigation and publication of the re-
port of the ad hoc commission was to effect the necessary remedy. The Mac-
quarrie Committee summarizes:
Any person who was found by the board, after inquiry, to have done any of the
enumerated acts being the same as those mentioned in section 498 of the Criminal
Code, and who did not cease his activities within ten days after the publication of
a report to this effect, made himself, under the Act, liable to a per diem penalty
up to one thousand dollars for each day he continued to offend.19
Despite the provision of such fines, "the expectation was that, through its
provision for public investigation and report, the Act would, in considerable
measure, deter harmful activities without resort to prosecution..."20
The last vestiges of the publicity approach are contained in the present
provisions requiring the Minister to publish within 30 days reports made to
him by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (RTPC). When pub-
lished, however, the reports are given little publicity. Seldom are more than
151d.
16 Report of the Committee to Study Combines Legislation and Interim Report on
Resale Price Maintenance (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1952) at 10.
17 Supra, note 14 at 25.
18 Id.
19 Supra, note 16 at 10.
20Id. at 10-11.
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1,000 copies printed. These are sent to federal Members of Parliament, the
provincial Attorneys General and to libraries. Occasionally they result in a
question in the House, usually by an NDP member. Their overall impact, in
terms of publicity which would focus public opinion on the perpetrators of
restraints of trade, is very modest indeed.
In their study Canadian Anti-Combines Administration 1952-1960,
Rosenbluth and Thorburn describe the reports as "detailed and factual ...
written for the serious student and not for the general reader who would find
them dry as dust."21 They point out that while they do "contain material that
journalists might use in a popular form... their length, dullness, and drab
format have served to make them one of the most uninviting of all government
publications."' 2 For a number of reasons, Rosenbluth and Thorburn point out
that "the reports have passed with very little notice in the press.."2 3
In recent years, the Director of Investigation and Research has presented
few Statements of Evidence to the RTPC; rather he has chosen to submit the
results of his investigations directly to the Department of Justice under s. 15
of the Act. Only five reports by the RTPC have been published since 1970
(the last in 1972), while forty-two were published between 1960 and 1969.24
Between 1960 and 1969 the Director launched forty-one cases (excluding
misleading advertising prosecutions), but only three were preceded by a re-
port 25 Publicity as a weapon of deterrence and certainly as a remedy has
been almost entirely without effect. One of the reasons this is so is due to the
public perception of offences in restraint of trade; an issue which will be
explored in Section F.
2. Reductions in the Tariff
It has long been argued that "the tariff is the mother of the trusts." The
great bulk of the oligopolies in the manufacturing sector exist behind rela-
tively high tariff walls.2 6 Potentially, the removal or reduction of tariffs where
domestic producers have monopolized the Canadian market or conspired to
raise prices and block entry, is a most powerful remedy. It first became avail-
able in 1897 under the Customs Tariff Act.27 The MacQuarrie Committee
Report pointed out that this remedy was first incorporated in the Combines
Investigation Act in 1910.
21 Gideon Rosenbluth and H. G. Thorburn, Canadian Anti-Combines Administra-
tion, 1952-1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) at 39.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 This number excludes the general inquiries or research inquiries, about six in
number.
2 5 These data were derived in the course of a study of the administration and
enforcement of the Combines Investigation Act conducted by the author and Paul K.
Gorecki of the Bureau of Competition Policy.
2 6 James W. Melvin and Bruce Wilkinson, Effective Protection in the Canadian
Economy, Special Study No. 9 for the Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1968) and B. W. Wilkinson and K. Norrie, Effective Protection and the Return
to Capital, Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
27 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-41.
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The Customs Tariff Act of 1897 had given authority for the government to have
an investigation held by a judge into the existence of a trust or combination that
unduly enhanced prices or promoted the advantage of manufacturers or dealers
at the expense of consumers. If such a trust or combination were found to exist,
the duty on the commodity or commodities affected could be lowered or removed
by executive action. By the Act of 1910 this action could be taken when a board
or a court had found such a combination existed.28
The only time this provision was used followed a complaint by the Cana-
dian Press Association in 1902 about a combine of paper manufacturers and
dealers unreasonably enhancing the price of newsprint. Apparently the corn-
bine had been in operation, on and off, since 1879. As a result the tariff was
reduced from 25 per cent to 15 per cent.2 9 The tariff remedy is currently con-
tained in s. 28 of the Act, which states:
Whenever, from or as a result of an inquiry under the Act, or from or as a result
of a judgment of the Supreme Court or Federal Court of Canada or of any
superior, district or county court in Canada, it appears to the satisfaction of the
Governor in Council that with regard to any article there has existed any con-
spiracy, combination agreement, arrangement, merger or monopoly to promote
unduly the advantage of manufacturers or dealers at the expense of the public,
and if it appears to the Governor in Council that such disadvantage to the public
is presently being facilitated by the duties of customs imposed on the article, or on
any like article, the Governor in Council may direct either that such article be
admitted into Canada free of duty, or that the duty thereon be reduced to such
amount or rate as will, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, give the public
the benefit of reasonable competition.3 0
Since 1947, the RTPC or Reports of the Commissioner in eleven cases
have recommended that tariffs be reduced or eliminated. In no cases has the
Cabinet taken any action to implement that recommendation.
3. Patents and Trademarks
Since 1910, where patents or trademarks have been used to do any of
the enumerated acts under the conspiracy section of the Act, the Attorney
General of Canada could apply to the Federal Court of Canada (formerly the
Exchequer Court) under s. 29 to make one or more of the following orders:
1) declaring void, in whole or in part, any agreement, arrangement or licence
relating to such use;
2) restraining any person from carrying out or exercising any or all of the
terms or provisions of such agreement, arrangement or licence;
3) directing the grant of licences under any such patent to such persons and
on such terms and conditions as the court may deem proper, or if such
grant and other remedies under this section would appear insufficient to
prevent such use, revoking such patent;
28 Supra, note 16 at 10.
29 V. W. Bladen, An Introduction to Political Economy (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1941) at 202.
s0 This and all subsequent references to the Act, unless otherwise stated, refer to
Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 amended by C.10 (1st Supp.) c. 10
(2nd Supp.) 1974-75-76, c. 76.
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4) directing that the registration of a trade mark in the register of trade
marks be expunged or amended; and
5) directing that such other acts be done or omitted as the Court may deem
necessary to prevent any such use;
This remedy has been used in only three cases to date; because the proceed-
ings were so protracted in each of these cases, they could hardly be described
as major victories for the Crown.
a) Optical Goods - subject to a Report by the Commissioner in 1948.31
b) Union Carbide - three patents covering the air bubble extrusion process
for producing polyetheline. 32
c) Union Carbide - two patents covering the corona discharge process used
for treating polyethelene to make it into adhesive for printing purposes 83
4. Prohibition Orders - Conduct Remedies
Following the MacQuarrie Committee Report of 1952, provision was
made under s. 31 (s. 30 since 1970) for the Attorney General to obtain an
order of prohibition, either in conjunction with other penalties or as the sole
remedy. Such orders are designed to "prohibit the continuation or repetition
of the offence or the doing of any act or thing by the person convicted or any
other person directed toward the continuation or repetition of the offence...
They can also take the form of injunctive relief in that it may be ob-
tained against a person who "is about to do or is likely to do any act or thing
constituting or directed toward the commission of an offence...",an
As can be seen from the Tables 3 and 6 in the Appendix, prohibition
orders have also been obtained in a high proportion of cases where a fine was
imposed. Where the documentary evidence is not as complete, where the
evidence is stale due to delays in detection or investigation and prosecution or
where the defendant's lawyer has been successful in his pre-trial representa-
tions to the Director or the Department of Justice, the Crown has settled for
a prohibition order only. In slightly over thirty per cent of the cases (exclud-
ing misleading advertising) started and completed between 1960 and 1975 a
prohibition order was the only remedy obtained. In such cases the prohibition
order operates somewhat like a consent decree in the United States.
Prohibition orders can be relatively brief ("This Court doth hereby
prohibit..." the offence alleged) or they can be much more detailed in their
specification of the conduct prohibited or required of the defendant. Examples
of the latter are R. v. Canada Safeway Ltd.86 and R. v. Electrical Reduction
81 This case is discussed in Report of the Director of Investigation and Research,
Combines Investigation Act, for the year ending March 31, 1950.
82Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1970 at 54-56.
33Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1972 at 29-30.
84 Supra, note 1 at 530.
3 5 1d.
86 (1973), 12 C.P.R. (2d) 3 and Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31,
1974 at 91-94.
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Company of Canada Ltd.3 7 The effectiveness of such orders depends on the
ability of the Director to follow up and ensure compliance. Because of the
frequency with which they are imposed, prohibition orders deserve a compre-
hensive study. It is necessary to know what impact they actually have on the
behaviour of firms and individuals subject to them.
5. Structural Remedies
Since the 1952 amendments to the Act, the courts have had the power,
"with respect to a merger or monopoly, [to] direct the person convicted or
any other person to do such acts or things as may be necessary to dissolve
the merger or monopoly in such a manner as the court directs.138 Only a
handful of merger monopoly cases have been decided in the past two de-
cades, i.e., R. v. Eddy Match Company Ltd.,89 R. v. Canadian Breweries,40
R. v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Company Ltd.,4 1 R. v. Electrical Re-
duction Company of Canada Ltd.,42 R. v. Canada Safeway Ltd.43 and R. v.
Allied Chemical Canada Ltd. and Commico Ltd." In the first, the offences
occurred before the penalty was enacted. The second, third and sixth cases
resulted in acquittals. In the fourth a conviction was obtained, a fine of
$40,000 imposed and a prohibition order made. In the fifth, because of the
delay in prosecution, the Crown had to settle for only a prohibition order. At
the present time there are two cases in the courts: R. v. K.C. Irving5 and R.
v. Canadian General Electric Company, Westinghouse and GTE Sylvania
Canada Ltd.40 The former is before the Supreme Court of Canada, while the
trial judgment of the latter is being awaited.
Dissolution of a merger or a monopoly is obviously a powerful weapon,
but it has never been used. If the industrial organization paradigm, that the
forces of market structure largely determine the economic and social per-
formance of firms and industries is true then the case for structural remedies
is strong.47 Simply fining firms which have grown by merger and acquisition
37 (1970), 61 C.P.R. 235; Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1970
at 52-53 (hereafter referred to as ERCO).
38 Supra, note 1 at 530.
80 (1952), 13 C.R. 217; 104 C.C.C. 39.
40 [1960] O.R. 601; 126 C.C.C. 133.
41 (1960), 32 W.W.R. (N.S.) 577; (1962), 39 C.P.R. 177.
4 2 Supra, note 37.
43 Supra, note 36.
44 Unreported judgment, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Vancouver, August 1,
1975, Bureau of Competition Policy mimeo 231-1.
4 5 Unreported Supreme Court Judgment, Supreme Court on Ontario, Toronto,
September 2, 1976, Bureau of Competition Policy mimeo 253-1.
4 GSupra, note 10; (1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 49 for Trial Court decision.
47 An excellent survey of the empirical relationship between market structure and
performance variables can be found in Leonard Weiss "The Concentration - Profits
Relationship and Antitrust" in H. J. Goldschmid, H. M. Mann and J. F. Weston (eds.),
Industrial Concentration: The New Learning (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1974) at
184-233. See, also, Walter Adams 'The Case for Structural Tests" in J. Fred Weston
and Sam Pletzman (eds.), Public Policy Toward Mergers (Pacific Palisades, Calf.:
Goodyear Publishing, 1969) at 13-26.
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into a highly concentrated industry, or issuing an order prohibiting price-
fixing, amounts to closing the barn door after the horse has left. Telling oligo-
polists not to recognize and to act on their interdependence is asking them to
fail to behave in a rational, self-interested fashion. Practically, it is impossible
for firms in a concentrated industry to ignore each other and to behave in-
dependently. If concentration is high enough they need not formally collude
to effect agreement upon variables such as price, output, and perhaps even
quality. Subject to the constraint of technical efficiency (economics of scale),48
the only really meaningful remedy is to break up the constituent firms, creat-
ing more, less interdependent, competing entities. Because it is difficult, and
perhaps socially expensive to 'unscramble the eggs', and because the Canadian
judiciary is so conservative and trusting of large aggregations of economic
power, it is unlikely that the structural remedies will ever be used.49
C. FACTORS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING FINES IN
COMBINES CASES
While not exhaustive, the following is a review in chronological order,
of principles set down by the courts in determining the size of the fines in
combines cases. A very wide range of factors have been considered.
In one of the earliest combines cases, R. v. Master Plumbers and Steam
Fitters Cooperative Association Limited in 1905, Clute J. stated:
A number of hitherto reputable firms, meeting around a table, and under the
pretence of sending in invited tenders, deliberately adopt a method by which,
apparently without the slightest compunction, they took from the public, that
portion of the public who happened to be interested, money to which they had
no possible claim, no more claim than any person has when meeting another in
the street he by force robs him of his money. Indeed, I think of the two offences
the robbery is the less offensive.50
After describing the additional mark up put on the fixed tenders to
finance the association as a "rake-off" and as "so much plunder", noting that
"for at least the last 2 or 3 years, it was admitted in the box that not one
single honest tender had come from the association," and that on one tender
alone the difference between the "the average tender and an outside real
tender amounted to nearly $6000,"51 the judge fined each of the two associa-
tions $5,000, one-half the maximum at that time. The approach of Clute, J.,
to invoking penalties became characteristic in combines cases. First, the re-
straints of trade are roundly condemned as violating the rights of Canadians
to enjoy the "benefits of free competition." Second, the fines levied are most
frequently small compared to the economic benefits associated with the of-
fence. Even when subject to statutory maxima, Canadian judges infrequently
4 8 See, Paul K. Gorecki, Economics of Scale and Efficient Plant Size in Canadian
Manufacturing Industries (Ottawa: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs,
1976).
49 L. A. Skeoch et al., Dynamic Change and Accountability in a Canadian Market
Economy (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976) see little virtue in structural
remedies even in extreme cases. They propose to put mergers and monopoly under the
jurisdiction of a specialized adjudicating body. See Chapters 2 and 3 of Part II.
50 (1907), 14 O.L.R. 295 at 304; 12 C.C.C. 371 at 381-82.
51Id. at 305 (O.L.R.); 383 (C.C.C.).
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imposed the largest fines available to them. In a companion case, R. v.
McGuire,52 which dealt with the individual members of the Master Plumbers
Association, Boyd, D.J., levied fines of $200 to $500 on each of the thirty-
eight defendants for a total of $10,000. In doing so, Mr. Justice Boyd stated:
Mhe following considerations and principles have been my guide:
From the material laid before me, it has been evident that the larger firms and
the leading master plumbers have controlled the men in smaller business, so that
they have been forced into the combination to endeavour to make a living and,
in some way, strive to better their condition.
Many of the defendants are hardly able to make headway, having large families
and little work.
Many have actually been losers by being driven into the combination.
These classes have been so leniently dealt with as possible.
As to those better off and in a larger way of business, I have scaled or graded so
as to impose some fine on those who have received dividends from the illegal
prices, but heavier fines are imposed, though far from the maximum of the
statute, on those who have made the largest gains from the combination.0
Although he felt Clute, J. had erred on the side of leniency, Boyd, C.J. felt
that he could not impose fines totalling more than the $10,000 levied against
the two associations.
The general proposition that penalties should be substantial and exem-
plary, but not vindictive was first enunciated in Canadian combines cases in
R. v. Alexander in 1932 where Raney, J. stated that "[Tihe penalties ought
not to be vindictive, but they should be substantial, and under the circum-
stances, particularly in view of the Master Plumbers in 1905, and the result
of that prosecution, they ought to be exemplary." 54 A very similar statement
was made by Laliberte, J. in R. v. Canadian Import Co. 5 and the principle
was followed subsequently in a number of cases.
Hope, J. in the R. v. Container Materials Ltd. case pointed out that all
of the accused were in par! delicto. However, he went on to say: "yet it ap-
pears to me that some were not as actively engaged in the prosecution of the
objects of the combination as others. Therefore in the imposing of penalties I
make some slight distinctions."' 5 He imposed the maximum fine on thirteen
corporations ($10,000) and one individual ($4,000), fines of $5,000 on
five corporations and $2,500 on one firm.
In the R. v. McGavin Bakeries Ltd. case in which six corporations were
convicted for a conspiracy which extended over 17 years, McBride, J. de-
scribed the $10,000 maximum fine under the Criminal Code as "quite inade-
quate." 15 7 Yet, in the case of McGavin's he divided the $10,000 fine among
three different, but related, legal entities. The judge indicated that he had not
overlooked the fact that, "during the depression the baking industry in West-
ern Canada, in common with industry throughout Canada, had to face ad-
52 (1906), 7 O.W.R. 225.
53 (1906), 7 O.W.R. 225 at 229.
54 (1932), 2 D.L.R. 109 at 127; 57 C.C.C. 346 at 365.
55 (1933), 61 C.C.C. 114 at 168.
10 (1940), 4 D.L.R. 293 at 330; 74 C.C.C. 113 at 153.
57 (1952), 101 C.C.C. 88 at 90.
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verse conditions and difficulties, nor that during the war-control period short-
ages, increased cost of materials other than flour, and higher wages, tended to
push competitive prices up to the maximum control price. 58s
In the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen case,
five corporations pleaded guilty to a combines conspiracy from 1936 to 1952.
Treleaven, J. fined all firms the maximum $10,000 saying "when one con-
siders the duration of time the agreements have been in existence and the
deliberation with which the whole area of the mechanical rubber goods sales
were brought under control, the maximum penalty is not excessive."5' 9
In R. v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. in 1953, Mr.
Justice Schroeder summarized his views on sentencing as follows:
- the Court must have regard to the magnitude of the aggregate business in-
volved, and the far-reaching evil consequences likely to flow from allowing such
schemes to operate unchecked or to go lightly punished. Inherent in these illegal
agreements of the accused companies are features so obnoxious to the welfare of
the community that if they were extended the effect upon the public might be
disastrous. 60
He described the maximum penalty of $10,000 as "wholly inadequate to
meet the ends of justice, even as a punishment to the least of these of-
fenders."61 He described the actions of the men involved as "cold blooded,
calculated and deliberate violations of the law of the land [which] call for as
severe a penalty as can be imposed within legal limits both to mark the
Court's condemnation of the enormity of the offence from the standpoint of
punishment, and for its deterrent effect upon other potential offenders."6' 2
Spence, J. in passing sentence in the R. v. Howard Smith Paper Mills
Ltd. case specifically rejected the argument put forward by defence counsel
that the maximum fine for corporations of $10,000 under the Criminal Code
(until November 1952) was to be reserved for only the most reprehensible
and inexcusable breaches of the law. He said, "I am of the opinion that it is
within the proper jurisdiction of the Court to comment on the propriety and
effectiveness of the penalty ... "63 He noted that Parliament had since re-
moved the ceiling on fines in such cases, recognizing the point of Schroeder, J.
that previous fines were "wholly inadequate." Although he did not feel there
had been an "excessively evil breach of the Statute,"'64 preferring to follow
the position of Masten, J.A., (to whom we will refer in Section F), Spence, 1.
felt he could justly levy the maximum fine. He further held that the court
ought not to inquire into the economic results of the lessening of competition
in determining sentence. Rather, "the amount of the penalty may be deter-
58 Id. at 90.
59 [1953] O.R. 856 at 858; 107 C.C.C. 88 at 90; 19 C.P.R. 75 at 76; 17 C.R. 252 at
253; O.W.N. 828.
60 [1954] O.W.N. 68; 107 C.C.C. 286 at 293; 20 C.P.R. 8 at 15; 17 C.R. 401 at
407-08.61 1d. at 293 (C.C.C.); 16 (C.P.R.); 408 (C.R.).
62 Id.
63 [1954] O.R. 663 at 665; 4 DJ..R. 517 at 520; 109 C.C.C. 213 at 216; 19 C.R.
242 at 249.
6ld. at 666 (O.R.); 520 (D.L.R.); 216 (C.C.C.); 245 (C.R.).
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mined more accurately considering the duration of the accused's participation
in the conspiracy, the activity with which an accused pursued its intent, the
size of the accused's business and such other factors."6 5 When this case
reached the Supreme Court, Cartwright, J., by way of obiter dictum, sug-
gested that the economic results of the illegal restraint might be taken into
account in determining the sentence:
...[Mhe court, except I suppose on the question of sentence, is neither required
nor permitted to inquire whether in the particular case the intended and actual
results of the agreement have in fact benefitted or harmed the public.66
This point was considered at some length in R. v. D.E. Adams Coal Company
and rejected by Williams, C.1.67 However, the results of the offences do figure
in assessing fines in some later cases as we shall see.
In Regina v. Northern Electric Co. Ltd., McRuer, C.J., clearly felt con-
strained by the $10,000 maximum fine. He paraphrased the words of Rand, J.
cited in the Introduction, describing previous fines as "a very trivial licence-
fee to commit crime." He went on to say:
If it were in my power I would impose very heavy fines that would operate as
a real deterrent to those who seek to carry on business contrary to the law ...
Therefore I impose the maximum fines with the exception of three cases where I
think that justice demands that I ameliorate the situation. If the maximum were
larger I would probably impose larger fines in the other cases, but I think I
must relate the fines in the case of these companies to the total maximum I am
permitted to impose ...68
McRuer, C. J. stressed the moral culpability of the executives, noting that the
conspiracy was "carried on by subterfuge, code-letters and such things." 69 In
imposing a fine of only $2000 on one firm the judge stated he did so "for the
reason that this company seemed to have a very minor part in the whole
scheme of affairs, in the conspiracy, and the company did not take the trouble
to destroy its records of what took place as the other companies did, which
indicates to my mind that it was more or less drifting along in an organization
with which it probably was not entirely sympathetic."70 Mr. Justice McRuer's
willingness to assess the differential culpability of members of the conspiracy
was not shared by Judson J. as we shall note below.
In the R. v. Dominion Steel and Coal Corp. Ltd. case six corporations
were convicted of a conspiracy running from 1933 to 1951. In imposing sen-
tence, Judson, J. rejected the argument that the parent firm and its subsidiary
ought to be considered as one in setting the fine.71 He also rejected considera-
tion of degrees, accepting the Crown's view that "you are either a party to a
05 Id.
60 [1957] S.C.R. 403 at 426; 8 D.L.R. (2d) 449 at 473; 118 C.C.C. 321 at 345;
26 C.R. 1 at 26.
67 (1957), 23 W.W.R. (N.S.) 419 at 429; 27 C.R. 47 at 53-57; (1958), 29 C.P.R.
163 at 169-72.
08 (1956), 116 C.C.C. 98 at 99; 24 C.R. 201 at 202.
69Id. at 99 (C.C.C.); 202 (C.R.).
701d. at 100 (C.C.C.); 203 (C.R.).
71 (1957), 116 C.C.C. 117 at 135; 27 C.P.R. 57 at 74; [1956] O.W.N. 753.
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conspiracy or you are not."72 In determining the amount of the fine Judson, J.
focused on "the duration of the conspiracy, almost 20 years, and the almost
complete control of the industry through the agreement in the matter of price
and conditions of sale."'78 He concluded:
It is quite impossible to regard a conspiracy of this kind as a minor commercial
misdemeanour. It is a serious offence against the Criminal Code and I think it
calls for the maximum fine, in the case of all the participants, and each company
will be fined $10,000 ... 74
Batshaw, J., in his decision in the R. v. Abitibi Power & Paper Co. Ltd. case,
which was not appealed, set out these criteria for sentence:
As has been observed by others before me, the sentence should not be vindictive,
yet it should be substantial and exemplary. As concerns the different accused,
moreover, regard should be had to the degree of their participation, bearing in
mind such factors as the initiative which they have shown in the conspiracy, the
length of time they have participated therein, their share of the market and related
factors.7 5
An even more comprehensive set of criteria was considered by Ferguson,
J. in R. v. Lyons Fuel Hardware6 after convicting three firms of a price fixing
conspiracy which lasted from May 1952 to April 1959 in the Sault Ste. Marie
area. The following points were noted in passing sentence: the willingness and
cooperation of the parties to the conspiracy; their refusal to reconsider their
identical bids to public institutions when asked to do so; attempts by some of
the participants to cover up evidence of the conspiracy - "which would indi-
cate ... that there was some degree of moral turpitude";77 the persistence of
the accused; the geographic extent of the business; the lack of evidence of
undue enhancing of prices and the difference in the positions of the various
companies. With respect to the geographic extent of the conspiracy, Ferguson,
J., unlike other judges, emphasized that the fact that it was a local conspiracy
"enhances the degree of the offence because the local citizens were necessarily
trapped. s78 He rejected the argument that the ownership of one of the com-
panies had changed and hence the new owners were unaware of what had
occurred, stating that the accused was a corporation and its acts and not those
of its owners were being judged.7 9 After noting that Parliament had some
years earlier repealed the limit on fines, he levied fines of $8,000, $4,000 and
$3,500.
In the R. v. Electrical Contractors Association of Ontario and Dent80
case Wells, J. quoted Judson, J. in the R. v. Dominion Steel and Coal Corp.
72 Id. at 136 (C.C.C.); 75-76 (C.P.R.).
78 id.
74Id. at 137 (C.C.C.); 76 (C.P.R.).
75 (1961), 131 C.C.C. 201 at 257-58; 36 C.P.R. 188 at 244-45.
76 (1960), 40 C.P.R. 27 at 40-42; [1961] O.R. 860; 30 D.L.R. (2d) 6; 131 C.C.C.
189.
77 Id. at 40.
781 d. at 41.
79 Id. at 41-42.
80 (1961), 37 C.P.R. 1; [1961] O.R. 265; 27 D.L.R. (2d) 193; 131 C.C.C. 145.
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Ltd."' case and added some points of his own in passing sentence. He noted
that the principal organizer of the conspiracy had warned the participants
about the meaning, as opposed to the wording, of certain documents and that
the accused knew they were breaking the law. "To use a term of common
parlance 'they thought they could get away with it.' "82 Wells, J. commented
that while the Association was unsuccessful in its object, "the intention to
create the unlawful restriction in supply was there. "I can only say that this
intention was a vicious example of industrial capacity which is not to be
condoned. '83 A fine of $7,500 was ordered and a prohibition order granted.
In the companion case, R. v. Dent, after the accused entered a plea of
guilty, Ferguson, J described the activities of the directing head and organizer
of the conspiracy as verging on "the tactics of the racketeer, or the gang-
ster."8' 4 He described Dent's efforts at preventing contractors, who refused to
participate in the conspiracy, from obtaining labour, as a "mild form of
blackmail" and as "an oppressive, coercive system." 85 Dent was also fined
$7,500, the largest amount of any individual in a combines case.
In 1966 four pencil companies pleaded guilty to a price-fixing con-
spiracy in operation for ten years in R. v. Eagle Pencil Company of Canada.
Lieff, I. stated that "the sentence should be sufficiently substantial as to be
considered exemplary while not being vindictive."8' 6 He reviewed the discus-
sion with respect to sentence in R. v. Northern Electric Co. Ltd.87 and re-
ferred to the point of McRuer, I., concerning the inadequacy of fines when
subject to the $10,000 maximum and the fact that the conspiracy was carried
on by subterfuge. He also cited the passage from Abitibi s noted above and
concluded that the case did not warrant the imposition of vindictive fines.
Three reasons were given "the lack of conspiratorial features," the fact
that the accused shared the market in varying degrees,89 and the fact that
the industry involved was not large. Sales of non-mechanical pencils were
$2 million in 1951 and rose to $3.2 million in 1960 - the period of the in-
dictment.0 The firms were fined in proportion of their market shares: $8,000,
$4,000, $2,000 and $2,000.
Brooke, J. in R. v. Ryan Builders Supplies (Windsor Limited), also de-
cided in 1966, asserted that the factors to be considered in assessing penalties
in combines cases were the same in any criminal case; namely, the gravity of
the offence and any mitigating circumstances. "The sentence must be punish-
81 Supra, note 71.
8 2 Supra, note 80 at 22.
83 ld. at 23.
84 Unreported judgment, Supreme Court of Ontario, November 28, 1961, Bureau
of Competition Policy, mimeo at 1.
85 Id. at 3.
86 Unreported judgment, Supreme Court of Ontario, March 28, 1966, Bureau of
Competition Policy, mimeo at 3.
87 [1956] O.W.N. 633; 116 C.C.C. 98; 24 C.R. 201.
88 Supra, note 75.
89 Supra, note 86 at 5.
00 Supra, note 86 at 2.
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ment and it must be a deterrent to others that they must not transgress this
law." 91 On the question of the gravity of the offence, Brooke, J. said he "must
consider the nature of the agreement... its scope and its duration in terms
of time .... "92
Perhaps the most comprehensive list of factors to be considered in deter-
mining the appropriate level of fines was given by Schatz, J. in R. v. St.
Lawrence Corporation.93 Seventeen of the twenty firms entered a plea of
guilty and the remainder were convicted after trial of participating in a nation-
wide price-fixing conspiracy in paper board products between 1947 and 1954.
Mr. Justice Schatz considered inter alia, the following factors:
1) The size of the companies.
2) Their share of the market of both container board and shipping containers.
3) Their position or influence in the conspiracy and the initiative in promoting
the agreement.
4) Length of time as a member of the conspiracy.
5) The limit of the penalty during the greater part of the indictment period
(as the offence continued after the amendment removing the limitation, the
Court is not subject to the previous limitation).
6) The penalties levied in previous cases.
7) The obtaining of and relying upon legal advice from an eminent counsel ex-
perienced in combines law which advice approved of the proposed agreement
and procedure - but I have not overlooked the evidence in respect to the
destroying of certain letters and the effort to disguise the scheme in the
beginning.
8) Previous convictions of the accused herein. In my opinion it is not proper to
consider the convictions registered since 1954, i.e., after the period to which
the indictment herein relates, as such convictions could not be considered as
a warning which the accused herein chose to ignore or defy.94
He specifically rejected the argument that in some companies there had been
changes in management and ownership since the end of the period of the
indictment saying that "[we] are dealing with corporations - separate legal
entities - and are not concerned with the individuals in management or the
identity of owners."95 Arguing that "the fines must be of such an amount as
will act as a real deterrent and must be very substantial in respect to com-
panies with substantial assets," 96 he levied the largest fines in any combines
case to that date. Three firms were fined $75,000, one was fined $45,000
and another $35,000. In all, the twenty firms were fined $391,500. This
judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal, where Schroeder, J.A. speak-
ing for the Court said:
Determination of the amount of the monetary penalty to be imposed was pecu-
91 Unreported judgment, Supreme Court of Ontario, September 16, 1966, Bureau
of Competition Policy, mimeo at 1.
92 ld. at 2.
93 (1966), 51 C.P.R. 170; [1969] 2 O.R. 305; 5 D.L.R. (3d) 263; 3 C.C.C. 263;
59 C.P.R. 97.
94 Id. at 191.
95 Id. at 192.
961d.
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liarly in the discretion of the trial Judge - a discretion with which an appellate
Court should not lightly interfere. The fact that the members of this Court, or
any of them, might have been disposed to impose a heavier penalty is not the
test to be applied.9 7
After pleading guilty to rigging bids on tenders for asphalt and road
paving contracts over a five year period, in R. v. Deschenes Construction
Ltd. the accused advanced the argument that the fines ought to be assessed
on the "ability to pay" principle. Boucher, J. stated:
... it seems that a principle of sentencing, taking into account only the economi-
cal means of a wrong doer cannot be adopted without reservation and qualifica-
tion. The nature of the offence as well as the circumstances surrounding its com-
mission must enter into consideration.98
The judge went on to point out there was a voluntary agreement between the
parties to attain a prohibited purpose. "At the time of their adherence to the
agreement, none of the participants had the right to expect punishment would
be determined on the proposed basis."99 Each of the six companies was fined
$1500.
In R. v. William E. Coutts Company Limited, defence counsel J. J.
Robinette argued that the one count of resale price maintenance of which
the firm was convicted, was a "stale offence, over thirteen years ago now.' 00
Grant, J. accepted this point and noted that he had found on the basis of the
other counts that the practice had not persisted. He levied a fine of $500 and
for the two reasons noted above he refused to grant a prohibition order. 10'
In the R. v. Philips Appliances Ltd., a prosecution under s. 34 of the
Combines Investigation Act (resale price maintenance and refusal to deal),
Fauteux, J. reviewed a number of cases in his reasons for sentence, none of
which dealt with offences in restraint of trade. He summarized them by stat-
ing that "the protection of society is the main criterion that the Court must
follow in pronouncing its sentence ... [t]he 'rehabilitation' criterion be-
comes of secondary importance"' 02 [in the case of corporations]. With respect
to the case at hand, the judge concluded:
The sentence must be such that it will prevent the accused from repeating its
offence by a means other than the one which it would use with regard to an
individual. [i.e., imprisonment] ... a fair sentence in the present case must punish
the accused, prevent it from repeating the offence and serve as a warning to any
party who might be tempted to imitate its action.' 0 3
A fine of $3000 on each of two counts was imposed. After quoting the words
97 (1969), 2 Q.R. 305 at 327; 5 D.L.R. (3d) 263 at 285; 3 C.C.C. 263 at 288; 59
C.P.R. 97 at 122.
98 (1967), 51 C.P.R. 255 at 257.
09 Id. at 257.
100 (1968), 1 O.R. 549 at 563; 67 D.L.R. (2d) 87 at 101; 2 C.C.C. 221; 54 C.P.R.
60.
10 1 Id. at 564 (O.R.); 102 (D.L.R.).
102 (1969), 57 C.P.R. 41 at 43.
103 Id. at 43.
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of Grant, J. in Coutts Cards,04 and adopting them, Fauteux J. also refused to
grant a prohibition order to the Crown. 1 5
The matter of the success of a conspiracy and its effect on the public as
a factor in sentencing was taken up by Hughes, J. in R. v. Norman Lathing.
Hughes, J. held:
Although the damage inflicted on the public is a highly relevant consideration, it
does not seem, in this case, that the offence is substantially lessened because it was
not as comprehensive as it might have been, or because the conspiracy was not as
comprehensive as it might have been.106
He granted fines of $2500 to $10,000 as requested by the Crown and pro-
hibition orders.
In R. v. Electric Reduction Company of Canada Ltd., in which the com-
pany pleaded guilty to three counts of merger and monopoly, Stark, J. ob-
served that "it is quite true that fines have on the whole been very small,
relative to the party's financial capacity."' 07 After quoting the words of
Schroeder, J. in the Firestone'0 8 case, the judge indicated he did not regard
the case at hand as "gross."'01 9 He levied fines totalling $40,000 which he de-
scribed as "lenient", for "there have not been very many of these cases
brought before the Court and perhaps it is unfair to endeavour to fall at this
time too heavily on this particular offender. 110 Stark, 3. described the order of
prohibition as "punitive" and indicated that as such it had been taken into
account in assessing the fines."'
In 1972, twelve suppliers of ready-mix concrete pleaded guilty to a
price-fixing conspiracy between January 1, 1961 and August 31, 1968 cover-
ing the Metro Toronto area in R. v. A.B.C. Ready-Mix Ltd.112 In considering
sentence, Osler, J. refused to recognize that sales of over 15,000 cubic yards
were not subject to the agreed price list. He did however recognize to some
extent the fact that one of the largest sellers sold about one-half its output
to "locked in customers" (affiliated companies or firms which habitually
dealt with it) which were not really open to competitors.1 13 The judge indi-
cated he took into account, where applicable, the factors listed in R. v. St.
Lawrence Corporation.1 4 He also observed that the increase in price over the
period of the conspiracy was not undue and that profits were not excessive.
"Indeed, for certain of the companies, the evidence is that substantial losses
'o4 Supra, note 100.
'o
5 Supra, note 102 at 44 (C.P.R.).
106 Unreported judgment, Supreme Court of Ontario, November 20, 1969, Bureau
of Competition Policy, mimeo at 2.
'o7 Supra, note 37 at 237.
'o8 Supra, note 60.
109 Supra, note 107 at 237.
'Io Id. at 238.
" Id. at 238.
112 (1975), 17 C.P.R. (2d) 91.
113 ld. at 93-94.
114 Id. at 95.
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were suffered."u 5 In addition, as mitigating factors, he noted that none of the
companies had previous convictions, that all had been cooperative in furnish-
ing the Crown with information, and that "very substantial savings to the
public purse" resulted from the pleas of guilty.116
With the exception of the firm referred to above, Osler, J. levied the
fines requested by the Crown which ranged from $7,500 to $35,000 for a
total of $245,000.
Rather than decrying the immorality of businessmen and levying a small
fine, County Court Judge MacRae, in the R. v. Browning Arms Co. of
Canada Ltd. case, described the offence as "very serious", reviewed previous
fines and described them as "a mere licence to carry on. '117 He then fined the
company $15,000 on each of four counts of resale price maintenance. Not
surprisingly, the decision was appealed. Arnup, J.A., speaking for the majority
reduced the fines to $2500 per count. In determining the appropriate sentence
he indicated the following factors were to be taken into account: protection of
the public interest, deterrence to others who might be tempted to commit
similar offences, the size of the firm (here the judge dealt briefly with the fact
that the American parent was much larger than its Canadian subsidiary), the
awareness of the defendant that he was violating the law, the level of fines
imposed in previous cases, and the level of sales and net profits of the firm
under consideration." 8
Browning's counsel pointed out, and Arnup J. A. noted, that a fine of
$60,000 would have been ten times the largest previous fine for a resale price
maintenance offence and three times the total of all reported fines to date.1 9
Brooke, J. A., dissenting in part, set the total fine at $25,000 for the
four counts. He argued that one had to look beyond the Canadian subsidiary
which had sales of $3.5 million to the U.S. parent (to whom "the net profit
will logically pass") which had sales of over $55 million.' 20 He also indicated
that it is net and not gross profit that should be considered. By net profit he
appeared to mean the profits solely attributable to the illegal trade practice
as he stated that "it was no doubt true that the profits earned are in part the
result of the excellence of the product...."121
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the judgment of Brooke, J.A. is
the fact that he recognized that penalties have to be related to the benefits or
potential benefits of the illegal act.
If crime is not to pay ... a fine should be in a sum sufficient to assure that there
115 Id.
11 Id.
117 Unreported judgment, Court of the General Sessions, Toronto, September 26,
1973, Bureau of Competition Policy, mimeo at 1.
118 (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 298 at 303-05; 15 C.P.R. (2d) 97 at 102-05. We should
note that the judge, except for the first two factors, did not list the factors as we have
done, but they may be properly inferred from his discussion.
11 Id. at 302 (C.C.C.); 101 (C.P.R.).
12Od. at 300 (C.C.C.); 99 (C.P.R.).
121Id. at 300 (C.C.C.); 100 (C.P.R.).
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is no profit in the criminal conduct in question ... the Court must do its best to
see to it that the fine is of sufficient quantum to take away any profit earned by
reason of the criminal marketing scheme and, in addition, and of importance, to
be a strong deterrent.122
While recognizing the desirability of uniformity of sentence, Brooke, J. A.
argued that [t]his does not mean that there will be such certainty of the prob-
able penalty for this crime against the consuming public that a would-be
offender could estimate the cost to him as he would an insurance risk.123
Following a plea of guilty in R. v. Alpa Industries, a conspiracy of lum-
ber dealers in the Metro Toronto area, Grant J. took the following factors
into consideration in levying fines: "the area to which the business of each
accused extended and the number of customers affected by their illegal ar-
rangements;" "the steps taken to make the conspiracy effective," including
arrangements with co-conspirators; the joint power of the accused to carry
out the conspiracy; the fact that the agreement related to minimum retail
prices, the system of protected accounts over which there was no competition,
the trade (credit) association was used to enforce the agreement; and the fact
that the association kept no records and its meetings were clandestine. 24 In
summary, the judge concluded that the objective in setting penalties is deter-
rence of similarly-minded businessmen. In mitigation of the offence, Grant, J.
noted that the conspiracy ceased when the investigation began, it had "only"
lasted three and one-half years and that the accused had pleaded guilty ("a
matter of great assistance in the administration of justice ... ,,).125 Fines of
$2500 to $25,000 were levied and a prohibition order granted.
In October 1974, Petrofina Canada Ltd. pleaded guilty to one count of
resale price maintenance. In handing down sentence Loukidelis D.C.J. was
urged by defence counsel to take into account the fact the company was a
first offender, that the act complained of was a solitary incident and that the
company was small relative to the total oil industry.126 The judge asserted
that he did not see the offence as an isolated act, but rather as part of a
company policy to maintain prices. After citing the words of Arnup, J. A.,
that the protection of the public interest and deterrence of other firms were
the principal factors in setting the fine, the judge said:
... I have taken into consideration not only the deterrent role that it must play
with the accused but on other companies in this business. Another factor is that
the product [gasoline] is of crucial importance in our economy and these com-
panies must be discouraged from regulating and manipulating their prices to the
detriment of Canadians.' 2 7
A fine of $15,000 was imposed and a prohibition order granted.
122 Id. at 300-01.
12 8 Id. at 301.
124 Unreported Judgment, Supreme Court of Ontario, June 26, 1974, Bureau of
Competition Policy, mimeo at 2-3.
12 Id. at 3.
126R. v. Petrofina Canada Ltd. (1975), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 315 at 317; 20 C.P.R. 83
at 84-85.
1271d. at 319 (C.C.C.); 86 (C.P.R.).
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In the B.C. Cement case, McKay, J. stated that in fixing the fines, he
considered, "among other things:
1) The period of the conspiracy, and the length of time each company was a
member of it;
2) The geographic area involved, and the consumption of the product in the
area;
3) The share of the market enjoyed by each of the conspirators;
4) The size of the companies involved;
5) The need to impose a penalty that will provide a real deterrent and will be
more than a minor cost of doing business.128
McKay 3. continued "To a lesser extent I have also considered penalties im-
posed in other cases, the pleas of guilty entered on behalf of the conspirators,
and the fact that each is without previous conviction.' 2 9
The factors cited above refer to R. v. Ocean Construction Suppliers Ltd.10
With respect to the ready-mix conspiracy in the Greater Victoria area two
additional factors were considered. The destruction of documents by the
conspirators and in the case of one firm, the expression of remorse by the
president of the company. 131 The imputed value of remorse is hard to deter-
mine. Over the period of the conspiracy, Ocean Construction's volume aver-
aged twice that of Butler. The fines were in exactly that proportion.
Both the Crown and the accused appealed the size of the fines and the
terms of the prohibition order. Seaton, J. A., speaking for all three judges,
made reference to the Crown's "rather complex computation based on the
conspirator's income [which arrived] at fines of many millions of dollars."'132
He said, "[in]come and ability to pay may be factors, but there are a great
many other factors to be taken into account in sentencing ... [s]entencing
cannot be approached as an arithmetic problem.' 33
The judge specifically rejected defence arguments that the large size of
the fines imposed were not foreseeable. "The complaint seems to be that the
price of a permit to commit the crime has been raised without notice and
that is unfair to the conspirators. That argument must fail."'134 Seaton, J.A.
specifically endorsed the argument of MacKay, J. that "the fine imposed must
be such as to bring home to certain members of the business community the
message that the combines legislation is to be obeyed and cannot be flouted
with impunity.'1 3 5 The Court also noted the factors taken into account by the
trial judge and concluded that there was no error in principle. 3 6 The appeal
and cross appeal were dismissed.
128 Supra, note 10 at 229.
12 Id. at 229.
180 Supra, note 10.
13Id. at 231.
132 (1975), 22 C.C.C. 340 at 342; 18 C.P.R. (2d) 166 at 169.
1s3 Id, at 342 (C.C.C.); 169 (C.P.R.).
13 Id. at 342 (C.C.C.); 169 (C.P.R.).
185 1d. at 169 (C.P.R.); 343 (C.C.C.).
130Id. at 343 (C.C.C.); 170 (C.P.R.).
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In R. v. Armco Canada Ltd., Lemer, J. indicated he took into consid-
eration the following factors in assessing penalties:'37
1. The length of time that the total conspiracy was active,
2. the period of the time of involvement of any particular defendant,
3. the share of the market of a defendant,
4. the relative size of the business or business operation of the
defendant,
5. the influence of each defendant on the conspiracy,
6. previous convictions under this or a similar statute, and
7. whether there should be an order of prohibition pursuant to section
30(1) of the Combines Investigation Act.
In his general remarks the judge asserted that the penalties must be sufficient
to deter the defendants from ever attempting to engage in a similar conspiracy
in the future and also sufficient to deter others who might venture into ar-
rangements similar to those employed by the culvert manufacturers.138 He
went on to say that "to fine a large, faceless corporation can hardly be said
to be punishment unless the fine is substantial."' 3 9
Upon appeal the convictions against two of the accused were quashed
and the fine of one participant reduced from $10,000 to $2,000.140 The final
result was that three firms were fined $100,000 or more, one was fined
$85,000, and three others were fined $15,000 or less.
Certainly the most comprehensive review of the authorities on the prin-
ciples of sentencing in combines cases was undertaken by Macdonald, l.A. in
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal, after reversing the acquittal of
seventy-three insurance companies for price-fixing in R. v. Aetna Insurance
Company. As the case is before the Supreme Court we will not review the
judge's analysis at any length. On the basis of the duration of the agreement,
market area covered, scope of the agreement and size of the companies, the
Crown proposed fines of $10,000 to $200,000 for a total of $8,235,000.141
Macdonald, l.A. levied fines of $300 to $15,000 for a total of $340,700. 42
Like Seaton, J.A. in the B.C. Cement case, whom he quoted, Macdonald,
l.A. said that "the size and ability to pay of the various companies is a factor
to be considered, but in my opinion is but one factor."'143 He noted that if
the fines were based on the total size of the companies (as the Crown pro-
13 7 Supra, note 9 at 150 (C.C.C.); 276 (C.P.R.); 577 (O.R.).
138Id. at 148 (C.C.C.); 274 (C.P.R.); 575 (O.R.).
139 Id. at 149.
140 Unreported judgment, Ontario Court of Appeal, Houlden, J.A., February 2,
1976, Bureau of Competition Policy, mimeo at 13-14.
141 Unreported judgment, Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Appeal Division, De-
cember 19, 1975, Bureau of Competition Policy, mimeo at 10, 12.
142Id. at 15-16.
143 Id. at 14.
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posed) rather than on the business done under the conspiracy the largest
companies would be assessed the largest fines even if they wrote little insur-
ance in the area affected. In addition to the amount of insurance premiums
earned by the various participants, Macdonald, J.A. stressed the earlier opin-
ion of the majority which did not attribute any moral turpitude to the ac-
cused.144
D. FINES IN COMBINES CASES: 1889-1975
1. Overview
Fines and prohibition orders (the latter only since 1952) have been
virtually the only penalties invoked upon conviction under the Combines In-
vestigation Act or the relevant sections of the Criminal Code. Only in mis-
leading advertising cases, as we noted, has the imprisonment penalty been
used. In two cases the term was one day and in R. v. James O'Brien Ltd.
case, the owner was sentenced to two years for a conviction under Section
37(1).145 There, the accused had a previous criminal record; upon appeal
the sentence was reduced to twelve months. Columnist Maurice Western was
critical of the Bureau of Competition Policy regarding this case. He asked,
"How were consumers harmed by this inaccurate representation?"; he found
the attitude of the department "very puzzling." He continued:
In respect of misleading advertising, it combines the microscopic approach with
the zeal of the Spanish Inquisition. But in regard to competition generally, it is
not much in favor of ptinitive actions (or even of definitions), tending instead to
the view that economic offences should be dealt with by regulating Tribunals.146
This proposition shall be examined in some detail. Table I in the ap-
pendix sets out the statutory provisions for the maximum fine or term of
imprisonment from 1889 to 1975. Table 2 sets out the penalties as of Jan-
uary 1, 1976 incorporating the Stage I amendments to the Combines Investi-
gation Act. An analysis of Table I shows that for the period of time when
Canada's restraint of trade laws were incorporated in both the Criminal Code
and the Combines Act (1910 - 1952) the maximum fines under the Code
were less than one-half those under the Act. As can be seen in Table 3, vir-
tually all combines cases were brought under the Criminal Code sections,
hence limiting the maximum fine on corporations during this period to
$10,000. From November 1952 until the end of 1975, there was no limit on
the fine that could be imposed under the Code or the Act in conspiracy cases.
Since November 1952 there has been no limit on the fines in merger, mono-
poly, price discrimination and resale price maintenance cases. Yet, is was not
until 1960 that the largest fine imposed on a single firm was $25,000. In 1966
the largest fine for a single firm was $75,000 and in 1974 it became $125,000.
(See Table 3.) There is some evidence that at least some judges chafed under
the $10,000 maximum under the Criminal Code prior to 1952. In the three
144 Id.
145 Supra, note 3 at 40-41.
146 Maurice Western, "Government zealous about misleading ads," Ottawa Journal,
March 8, 1975 at 36.
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rubber cases decided in 1953, but for which the $10,000 maximum applied,
each firm (a total of twenty-two) was fined the maximum. In R. v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd., Schroeder, I., as we have noted, described
the maximum penalty as "wholly inadequate to meet the ends of justice.' 47
In R. v. Northern Electric Co. Ltd., McRuer, C.J.H.C., as we have seen, made
the same point.148 These judges may have felt constrained by the statutory
limits before 1952, but most judges did not. The maximum fine -was levied on
one or more defendants in only 36 per cent of all conspiracy cases during the
period in which the ceiling existed.
As of January 1, 1976, the maximum penalties for misleading advertis-
ing have been increased, but only in the case of proceedings by summary
conviction (Table 2). The ceiling on fines is increased to $25,000 from
$10,000 (except in the case of double ticketing) and to one year imprison-
ment from six months. For proceedings by indictment the penalties are un-
changed - a fine at the discretion of the court or five years imprisonment or
both.
Although the Stage I amendments were hailed as increasing the penalties,
in the case of conspiracies (s. 32) a limit of $1,000,000 was substituted for
a fine at the discretion of the court i.e., a potentially unlimited fine. Note
that the fines remain unlimited in the case of mergers and monopolies and with
respect to bid-rigging, price maintenance and price discrimination. Ap-
parently the thinking behind the $1,000,000 figure was that it would indicate
to the judges the seriousness with which Parliament viewed the crime. It
would represent "a figure for the judge to shoot at" in imposing sentence.149
If this argument has merit one could suggest that $2,000,000 is an even better
figure to shoot at. Yet pressures from business interested in the elimination of
the provision for a maximum fine of $2,000,000 and/or imprisonment for up
to five years for second or subsequent Section 32 convictions from the amend-
ments as finally enacted. Bill C-256 (the Competition Act) had also provided
that previous convictions under s. 32 or ss. 411 or 498 of the Criminal Code
would count in determining the application of the higher maximum fine for
the second or subsequent convictions.
As a final comment on Table 2 it is suggested that there appear to be
major inconsistencies in the maximum penalties for misleading advertising
(by indictment), representations as to tests and testimonials, pyramid selling,
referral selling, promotional contests, and double ticketing and sales above
advertised prices.
2. Fines in Merger and Monopoly Cases
Table 4 sets out the fines in the three merger and monopoly cases in
which the Crown was able to obtain convictions. The number of cases here is
147 Supra, note 60 at 293 (C.C.C.); 16 (C.P.R.); 48 (C.R.).
148 Supra, note 87 at 99 (C.C.C.); 202 (C.R.).
149 "The reasons for increasing fines is to clearly indicate to the courts that offences
under the Act are a serious matter and to prevent the courts as they have sometimes
done in the past, to give low penalties for serious offences." From Bureau of Competition
Policy, "Background Papers, Stage 1 Competition Policy" (Ottawa, April 1976) at 34.
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so small, and the most important one (K.C. Irving)150 is under appeal, that it
is difficult to draw any strong conclusions. It would appear from the Eddy
Match'5' case that when the Crown did lay charges under the Act rather than
the Criminal Code, it was able to receive the benefit of the higher maximum
under the Act. But relative to the duration of the combine (twenty-three
years) and probable economic benefits enjoyed by Eddy Match and its sub-
sidiaries, the fines seem insignificant. As we noted in Section I, the size of
the fine in the ERCO 52 case was reduced in face of the detailed prohibition
order put forward by the Crown. In the K.C. Irving case the costs of prosecu-
tion have already exceeded the fine imposed and the case has yet to come
before the Supreme Court of Canada. More important than the fines totalling
$150,000, is the order to divest the two Moncton newspapers. 153
3. Fines in Conspiracy Cases
Table 3 sets out information on the fines in conspiracy cases since the
first "Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations formed in
Restraint of Trade" was passed in 1889. It provides some historical perspec-
tive and to support our contention that the fines in combines cases have, al-
most without exception, been small relative to the potential benefits arising
from conspiracies in restraint of trade.
Fines in conspiracy cases (for a single firm) have ranged from $1.00 in
R. v. Morrey'54 to $220,000 in the recent B.C. cement and ready-mix case
where Ocean Construction Supplies was involved in all three separate indict-
ments in the same trial. The data of Tables 3 and 4 is summarized in Table
5; it shows the average fine for individuals and for corporations separately
for five time periods. Between 1889 and 1910 there was only one conviction
involving corporations and each was fined $5,000 in 1905. There were no
additional successful prosecutions until 1926. Between 1926 and 1942 the
average fine per firm was $2,774. No successful prosecutions occurred be-
tween 1943 and 1949. Between 1950 and 1959 the average fine per corpora-
tion increased to $7,046. During this period 147 firms were fined in seventeen
cases. Over the next decade (1960 - 1969) the average increased only mar-
ginally to $7,576 even though all the cases were in the period when the maxi-
mum fine was unlimited. The great bulk of the cases decided in the 1950 -
1959 period were, in fact, subject to the $10,000 maximum. Over the last
six years (1970 - 1975 inclusive) the average fine per firm almost doubled
to $13,758. This last figure is significantly influenced by the large fines im-
posed in the Armco 5, and B.C. Cement50 cases. If either of these is removed
the average falls to $10,700; if both are removed it falls to $8,149 - only
slightly higher than the average for 1960 - 1969.
150 Supra, note 10.
151 Supra, note 39.
152 Supra, note 37.
10 Supra, note 10 at 294-96.
164 (1956), 24 C.R. 319; W.W.R. 299: 115 C.C.C. 337; (1957), 6 D.L.R. (2d)
114 (Appeal).
155 upra, note 9.
150Supra, note 10.
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Between 1890 and 1955 the maximum fine in the United States for
violations of the Sherman Act was $5,000. In 1955 it was raised to $50,000
for individuals and corporations. Green reports that between 1946 and 1953
the average fine, like Canada, was well below the maximum; the average fine
was $2,600. During the period 1955 to 1965 the average fine was $13,420
for corporations and $3,365 for individuals. From 1955 to 1960 the maxi-
mum fine was never imposed on an individual and in only four of 130 Sher-
man Act cases was the maximum fine imposed on a corporation. He notes
that in only one of the 150 sentences handed down in the "Great Electrical
Conspiracy," was the maximum fine imposed. "The average corporate fines
per count in these cases was $16,500, although the commerce affected totaled
some $7 billion (or an overcharge of approximately $840 million based on
a modest 12 per cent estimated inflated price). . .. ,-157 From July 1966 to
December 1969 the maximum fine was levied in only nine of forty-four cases.
In December 1974, the maximum fine for Sherman Act offences was in-
creased to $100,000 for individuals and/or up to three years imprisonment,
while the maximum fine for corporations was increased to $1,000,000.
Returning to the Canadian data we find that despite the removal of the
ceiling in 1952, the average fine per corporation in conspiracy cases has only
increased by 175 per cent in seven decades. During the same period con-
sumer prices increased about 4.5 times and wholesale prices by 7.2 times
(Table 9). If we take the average for 1926-1942 as our benchmark, then the
average fine per corporation has increased by slightly under five times. Be-
tween 1931 and 1975 consumer prices increased by 2.6 times and wholesale
prices by 5.2 times. By the consumer price index average fines in the 1970's
were larger in constant dollars than those between 1926 and 1942, while
according to the wholesale price index such fines decreased in real terms. In
any event, the calculations are based on the idea that the average for the
period 1926-1942 represents the "appropriate" level of fines in conspiracy
cases. It is this writer's contention that they were far too small to act as a
deterrent to price-fixing. The legal costs of defending a combines case are
probably greater than the fine.
As an additional measure of the inadequacy of the fines in conspiracy
cases, we have set out, where the data were available, the cost of prosecution
in the cases listed in Table 3. These amounts do not include the costs of in-
vestigation, but only payments to outside Crown counsel and associated ex-
penses. No account is taken of the value of time of the permanent officials in
the Office of the Director of Investigation and Research or his predecessors.
Of the forty-three "cases" (for accounting purposes some cases were com-
bined) for which we have data, in thirteen the total amount of the fines levied
was less than the costs of prosecution. In R. v. McGavin Bakeries Ltd.158 pro-
secution costs exceeded $111,000 while the fines totalled $20,000. In the
Belt Mg.159 case the fine was $300 while the costs exceeded $5,000 and in
1
157 Mark J. Green et al., The Closed Enterprise System (New York: Bantam
Books, 1972) at 170.
is (1951), 3 W.W.R. 289 (N.S.).
159 As yet unreported.
19761
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
R. v. Morrey'00 some $27,676 was expended and the fine was $1.00 How-
ever, a review of Table 3 does indicate a significant number of cases in which
the fines did cover the costs of prosecution several times over. Yet, when the
total costs of investigation, including those of the RTPC, if the case was
brought before that body, are added to the costs of prosecution, it is doubt-
ful that in many of the cases the fines covered the costs involved.
In general, individuals have not been charged in conspiracy cases if a
corporate entity exists. Only if individuals have been carrying on business in
their own names (or as unincorporated entities) or they were the "guiding
hand" in a trade association engaged in price fixing, has the Crown proceeded
against them. With very few exceptions, the fines have been small. In the
earliest cases (circa 1906) the average fine was only $269. In the period
1926-1942 the average increased to $843, including the maximum fine of
$4,000 to the organizer of the Container Materials cartel. In the 1950's fewer
individuals were convicted and the average fine declined to $564. Even fewer
were convicted in the 1960's (as Table 5 shows) and the average fine was
$944 - primarily due to the fine of $7,500 on the organizer of the Electri-
cal Contractors Association conspiracy. Individuals, like corporations, have,
on the basis of the historical record, little to fear in combines cases.
We shall now examine in more detail five price-fixing cases in the 1960's
and 1970's.
(a) R. v. Ocean Construction Supplies Ltd.""6
This case, in which the largest fine to date ($125,000) for a single
count was imposed, involved three separate conspiracies. One was province-
wide and involving cement and two were regional conspiracies involving
ready-mix concrete. This discussion will concentrate on the two firms (three
entities because of corporate organizations) involved in the cement prosecu-
tion. The two firms accounted for 90 per cent of the cement sold in B.C. over
the 10 year period of the offence (1962 through 1971). Canada Cement La-
farge Ltd. is the largest cement company in Canada operating in all 10 prov-
inces. As of Dec. 31, 1972 its total assets were $345.5 million and its net
profits for 1972 amounted to $17.2 million. As the Crown pointed out, a fine
of $150,000 as a proportion of 1972 net earnings, compares to a fine of $131
to a man earning $15,000 per year.
A memorandum prepared by the Department of Justice stated:
It is proposed to show, also, that a $150,000 fine is not excessive by relating it to
the costs attributable to the conspiracies. For example, in this connection, in 1970,
British Columbia cement customers of Lafarge paid 430 per ton, or about
$101,000 more than the estimates of production cost increases for that year. This
extra cost was imposed on the consumer because Lafarge agreed with Ocean to
increase the base price of cement in B.C. to $1.13, notwithstanding that their in-
ternal estimate of a production cost increase was only 700. When this unsupported
price increase of 43¢ a ton is applied to Lafarge's 1970 cement sales of 236,257
100 Supra, note 154.
161 Supra, note 10; the case was reported extensively in the Vancouver Sun, Feb-
ruary 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1974 and on March 11 and 13, 1974.
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tons, the extra cost to the consumer is approximately $101,000. This estimate is
for only one year of a price-fixing combine that lasted nine (sic) years.162
With respect to Ocean Construction Supplies (now owned by Genstar)
its assets totalled $43.9 million at October 31, 1971 and had sales of $34.9
million and net profit of $2.5 million for the ten months ended October 31,
1971. Pro-rated on an annual basis a fine of $150,000 would represent 5.01
per cent of net profits (for one year only). This would be equivalent to $751
for an individual with an annual salary of $15,000. While the judge during
the course of the argument on sentence suggested that the "fines would not
come out of petty cash", in fact they could be paid easily out of the firm's
cash balances. The Crown calculated that a fine of $150,000 would absorb 8
per cent of Ocean Construction's cash and short term investments but only
0.5 per cent of Canada Cement Lafarge's.
The defendants appealed the sentences unsuccessfully. Seaton l.A.
stated: "As to the shock at the size of the fines I say, 'Good' I hope that some
people are sufficiently shocked that they will reject this sort of conduct in the
future." 163
Given the duration of the conspiracy, and the volume of trade involved, the
fines, which totalled $250,000 in the cement case and $137,000 and $45,000 in
the Vancouver and Victoria ready-mix cases respectively, do not appear to con-
stitute a strong deterrent or an example to other potential offenders. The
counsel for Ocean Construction supplies argued that there was no evidence
of price gouging and that the conspiracy was "self-preservative or defensive?'
in nature. He said, "there was no evidence of any consequences detrimental
to the public flowing from the arrangement." To this point, Mr. Justice
McKay replied, "If one accepts that, one wonders why they bothered to make
the agreement. I presume they had some intention in mind. It wasn't done to
hurt themselves."'164
(b) R. v. Armco Canada Ltd.165
Ten firms were charged and seven convicted of a price-fixing conspiracy
between November 1962 and August 1967 covering Ontario and Quebec.
The selling value at the plant (national totals) ranged from $19.3 million in
1963 to $27.8 million in 1965 to $25.8 million in 1967.166
Apparently the conspiracy was successful in increasing several of the
firms' profits. Between 1963 (before the conspiracy) and 1966, Armco's
profits almost doubled to approximately $1.5 million. The profits of one of the
unindicted co-conspirators increased six-fold over the same period. Armco
was fined $125,000, which would appear to suggest that "crime pays." In his
162 March 1, 1974.
163 Supra, note 10 (appeal on sentence) at 169.
164 As quoted in the Vancouver Sun, February 22, 1974 at 13.
165 Supra, note 9.
166 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report in the Matter of an Inquiry
Relating to the Production, Manufacture, Sale and Supply of Corrugated Metal Pipe
and Related Products (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970) at 2.
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reasons for sentence, Lerner J. focused on the sales of culverts to the Depart-
ment of Highways of Ontario over the period of almost identical bidding
between December 1963 and August 1967. Data in the Crown's submission
indicated that such sales totalled $7.3 million. Citing sales for the individual
firms, Lerner J. stated they were "sufficient for the purpose of fixing fines.' 67
Regrettably, the judge appears to have significantly underestimated, pri-
marily on the basis of the Crown's submission on sentence, the total amount
of trade effected. Between 1964 and 1967 total sales of metal culverts in
Canada amounted to $103.5 million.'68 The indictment specified Quebec and
Ontario and was not limited to culverts supplied to Provincial Departments
of Highways. Therefore, it appears that perhaps $50 million in sales were in-
volved over the four years the conspiracy was effective. If prices were
raised by only 1 per cent the benefits would exceed the total amount of the
fines levied ($447,000 after appeal). Since the fines will be paid more than
eight years after the end of the conspiracy their real impact, recognizing the
time value of money, will be very small. Most assuredly, the legal fees will
exceed the cost of the fines. While the latter are tax deductible, the fines are
not. Perhaps it should be pointed out that five of the seven firms convicted
in 1974 pleaded guilty in November 1959 to a national pricefixing conspir-
acy carried on between February 1925 and July 1957. The firms were fined
a total of $65,000 and Armco received the largest fine, $20,000.169 The de-
terrent effect of such fines is hard to find.
(c) The Resilient Flooring Case 70
This price-fixing conspiracy occurred in Metro-Toronto between 1960
and 1963. The eleven conspirators accounted for 70 to 95 per cent of the
value of all resilient flooring contracts for commercial or industrial installa-
tions. Over the four years the value of the contracts completed by the eleven
firms was $9,943,000. Between April and September 1963 the markup on
contracts averaged 33 per cent when the "fair rate" (as given by those in the
trade) was 12 per cent. Even if prices were increased by one per cent (a
very low figure) the benefits to the conspirators amounted to $100,000. Yet
the Crown only requested maximum fines of $2,500 per firm. Altogether,
the fines totalled $20,000, which would seem to be a most modest tax on the
benefits of the conspiracy. The one individual charged (in addition to the
eleven firms) was fined $400.
(d) R. v. Alpa Industries'71
In this case some thirteen lumber dealers pleaded guilty to a price-fixing
agreement which lasted between February 1965 and October 1968. These
firms had two-thirds of the market in the Metro-Toronto area (3-50 mile
radius of the city). Their sales in 1968 totalled $15.5 million. The fines to-
talled (levied in 1974) $144,700, ranging from $2,500 to $25,000. The fines
107 (1975), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 147 at 151.
108 RTPC Report at 2.
109 See, Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1960 at 13.
170 See, Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1970 at 44.
171 See, Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1975 at 26.
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amounted to from 0.14 per cent to 0.42 per cent of sales in 1968 alone. Since
the conspiracy was conducted over three years, the fines could only be de-
scribed as a minute toll on the firms' revenues.
(e) R. v. Burrows 172
This conspiracy case involved an agreement among the three major im-
porters and seven major distributors of Japanese oranges over an eighteen
year period (1947 through 1964). The total landed value of imports over
the period was between $45 million and $50 million; in 1964 the amount
was $4.8 million. About 90 per cent of the oranges were sold in Western
Canada. The three brokers accounted for 100 per cent at the import level
while the seven distributors accounted for close to 80 per cent of the volume
sold in Western Canada. The judge imposed fines of $98,500, the largest
being $18,000 on a firm previously convicted of a combines offence. The total
of the fines amounted to 0.22 per cent of the landed value of the oranges.
As a 'business tax' it could hardly be expected to change the behaviour of
the firms involved.
4. Fines in Resale Price Maintenance Cases
Table 6 sets out the fines in every resale price maintenance/refusal to
supply case since the section was incorporated in the Combines Investigation
Act in 1952. For the thirty cases decided between 1954 and July 1975 (in-
cluding subsequent appeals) the total fines levied amounted to $97,805.
However, only four cases accounted for $50,000 of this total. The median
fine was only $1,500 and in 40 per cent of the cases the fine was $1,000 or
less. In only one-fifth of the cases did the fine amount to $4,000 or more.
Data summarized in Table 5 indicates that the average fine for the three cases
in the 1950's was $502. For the 1960's the average fine tripled to $1,550.
Between 1970 and 1975 the average increased to $4,953. This increase was
almost entirely accounted for by the imposition of two $10,000 fines and
two of $15,000. If these are removed, the average for 1970-75 is only $2,438.
As Table 6 indicates, for virtually all of the cases for which we have data,
the costs of prosecution outweigh the fine.
An analysis of the resale price maintenance (RPM) refusal to supply
cases since 1960 makes it clear that the majority involve distribution schemes
which are effectively national in scope. However, in reading the summary of
the cases in the Director's Annual Report one might get the impression that
because the count or counts in the indictment are often localized that the
practice is merely local in nature. With this in mind, the average fine in RPM
cases is seen to be small indeed. The case of R. v. Black & Decker Manu-facturing Co. Ltd.'73 provides a good illustration.
In December 1974 Black & Decker was convicted of RPM and refusal
to supply on two counts over the period September 30, 1966 to September 1,
1970. Evidence was presented indicating that the firm enjoyed 38 per cent of
172 (1968), 54 C.P.R. 95.
173 [19751 1 S.C.R. 411; (1974), 15 CC.C. (2d) 193; 13 C.P.R. (2d) 97; 43 D.L.R.
(3d) 393.
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the Canadian market for power tools for home and construction industry use
in 1967.1'4 Upon a plea of guilty, Boland, J. fined the firm $5,000 on each
of the two counts and issued a prohibition order. The judge described the fine
as, "a substantial penalty", and in setting it he stated that in establishing the
penalty, "the protection of the public must be paramount." 175 Given the
millions of dollars of sales involved it is hard to agree with the judge. Surely
/the total fine in this case, the second largest on record, cannot serve as a
deterrent to Black & Decker. The potential benefits of RPM are simply too
great to expect rational, profit-maximizing managers not to take the risk again.
In the R. v. Browning Arms Co. of Canada Ltd. case the trial judge
levied a fine of $15,000 on each of four counts of RPM for a total of $60,000.
In doing so he stated, "This price fixing business by large companies is an
iniquitous part of the commercial life of Canada .... ,,176
In the appeal court, Arnup, J.A. (Kelly, J.A. concurring) pointed out
that the company anticipated sales of $3.5 million in 1973 and gross profits of
$140,000. The offences covered the years 1968 to 1971. The net profits in
1970, 1969 and 1968 were $43,500, $66,000 and $63,500 respectively.
Although the Crown brought thirteen counts the firm pleaded guilty to only
four. The appeal judge stated, "I think it appropriate to view the appropriate
fine in this case in global terms,"'177 and he reduced the total fine from
$60,000 to $10,000.
Since the trial decision in R. v. Browning Arms Co. of Canada Ltd. in
September 1973, total fines of $15,000 have bene awarded in two cases
(R. v. Hartz Mountain Pet Supplies Ltd. 7 8 and R. v. Petrofina Canada
Ltd.170 ) and, as we have noted, the fine was $10,000 in the Black & Decker'8 o
case. Perhaps the example of even the reduced fines in R. v. Browning Arms
Co. of Canada Ltd.181 encouraged later judges to set their sights higher. Cer-
tainly the Crown raised its sights when it appealed the total fine of $2,500 in
the Kito carpet sweepers case and it was increased to $6,000.l8
5. Fines in Misleading Advertising Cases
In terms of the volume of cases misleading advertising cases outnumber
conspiracy, merger, and RPM cases combined by a six to one ratio. Between
April, 1960 and March, 1975 only ninety-one conspiracy, merger or RPM
cases were launched compared with 572 misleading advertising cases. 188 In
the last five fiscal years (1970/71 to 1974/75) in some 482 misleading ad-
174 Globe and Mail, December 18, 1974 at B-2.
'75 Id.
170 Supra, note 117 at 1.
'77 (1974), 15 C.P.R. 97 at 104.
178 Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1974 at 44.
170 Supra, note 126.
180 Supra, note 173.
181 Supra, note 177.
182 See, Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1976 (forthcoming).
18 Supra, note 25.
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vertising cases charges were brought. There has been an explosion of activity
in this area in the past eight years. In the three fiscal years (1966/67 -
1968/69) only ninety files were opened in respect of misleading advertising
complaints. In 1969/70 the number was 412184 (effective July 15, 1969,
s. 306 of the Criminal Code became s. 36 of the Combines Investigation
Act). In 1970/71 the number of files opened had increased to 2,250 and in
1974/75 this number had doubled again to 5,068. The number of com-
pleted investigations increased from 753 in 1971/72 to 1,047 in 1974/75.185
While the level of activity by the Bureau of Competition Policy in the area
of misleading advertising has obviously been increasing very rapidly, the level
of fines imposed in such cases has, with a handful of exceptions, been very
low.
Table 7 provides data for three, twelve-month periods between late
1970 and early 1975. Throughout the period the fine in about two-thirds of
the Section 36 cases was $200 or less. In 1970/71 the fine in 63.4 per cent
of the Section 37 cases was $400 or less. In 1972/73 this proportion has de-
clined slightly to 53.1 per cent and by 1974/75, in 45.3 per cent of the s. 37
cases the fine was in the range of $401 to $1,000. If we combine the three
periods, we note that in not one s. 36 case has a fine of over $1,000 been
levied. In only 16.9 per cent of the 154 s. 37 cases did the fine exceed $1,000.
In Table 8 a more detailed analysis is presented of fines in cases decided
in calendar years 1973 and 1974. The average fine per s. 36 case increased
from $229 to $262. This increase is most notable for individuals in terms of
the first count in each case. The increase was from $44 in 1973 to $212 in
1974. The average fine per Section 37 case decreased between 1973 and
1974. This is due to the fact that the fine in one case (Benson & Hedges,180
$27,500 on two counts) increased the average in 1973 from $838 to $1,347.
On a first count basis, the average fine levied on corporations increased from
$888 to $1,124.
A few larger fines were reported in 1974/75, all under s. 37. For exam-
ple, Robert Simpson Ltd., S. C. Johnson (fabric softener) and Ameublement
Leger Inc. (furniture) and Capital Sewing Centres were each fined $5,000
for one count. I.P.S. (Handicrafts) Ltd. was fined $10,000 on each of two
counts. Dominion Stores was fined $8,000 on one count. The largest fine to
date was imposed in Benson and Hedges in March, 1973 when the firm was
fined $2,500 on the first count and $25,000 on the second under s. 37 on a
plea of guilty. Previously, the largest fine was $10,000 in the Shoppers Drug
Mart case in November 1972, for one count under s. 37.
In comparison to the fines levied in the great majority of misleading
advertising cases, these fines seem rather large. In comparison to the poten-
tial benefits of violating the law they are small.
184 Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1971 at 71.
185 Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1975 at 51.
186 As yet unreported. See, Report of the Director, supra, note 3, March 31, 1973
at 94.
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In R. v. S. C. Johnson and Son Ltd.87 the firm advertised that it had
reduced the price of "New Formula Rain Barrel Fabric Softener." In fact it
had not reduced the price, but more importantly the "new formula" had so
watered down the fabric softener that the instructions indicated that twice as
much had to be employed as compared with the "old" formula. Pilutik, J.
rejected the defendant's contention it was all an honest mistake. He said it
was coolly calculated, "and a great deal of thought was put into the plan."
He went on to say that it was "important that an example be set"'u8 - yet
he imposed a fine of only $5,000 upon a plea of guilty. How can it be ex-
pected that the firm takes this small toll on its total advertising and promo-
tion budget seriously? Such fines simply confirm that the costs of violating the
law are very small relative to the benefits.
As noted, the largest fine levied to date was against Benson and Hedges
Tobacco Company. The case involved a promotion for Belvedere cigarettes
in 1969 and 1970 promising "instant cash certificates of $2,500 to $25,000
right out of the blue." The Crown showed that no $25,000 certificates could
have been found in 1970 although three of that amount and 39 of $2,500
were found in 1969. Mackay, J. said, "Although there were no winners in
connection with this count, the Court is going to declare one winner - the
Crown"' 89 and fined the firm $2,500 on the first count and $25,000 on the
second. The $27,500 should be put in perspective. Between September, 1969
and June, 1970 the total advertising budget for the Belvedere promotion was
$1,474,885. Therefore the fines simply increased the cost of the promotion
by 1.86 per cent. If the firm had distributed the same number of $25,000
certificates in 1970 as it had in 1969 the net profit of violating the law, as-
suming a tax rate of 50 per cent, was some $10,500 (i.e., x.5($25,000 x 3) -
$27,500). It is naive to suggest that the morality or social stigma of the of-
fence will overcome the net economic benefits of violating the law in respect
of misleading advertising.
Contrast these 'large' fines to the judgment in a case brought in Quebec
against Koscot Interplanetary of Canada Limited. The firm was fined $175,000
or faced seizure of all its assets in Canada for its pyramid selling scheme.' 90 In
the Figure Magic case involving a weight reduction scheme, the Department
of Justice, following the investigation of the Bureau of Competition Policy,
obtained summary convictions of the principals involved in publishing an ad-
vertisement, attesting to the benefits of the slimming scheme without adequate
testing. The three men were fined a total of $1,300. In the related fraud charge,
Figure Magic is alleged to have defrauded its customers of $1,414,228.191
187Unreported judgment, Provincial Judges Court (Criminal Division) Winnipeg,
Manitoba, February 14, 1975, Bureau of Competition Policy mimeo at 225-31.
188 Montreal Gazette, March 5, 1975 at 41.
189 Montreal Gazette, March 24, 1973 at 3.
190 Montreal Gazette, November 2, 1972 at 4.
191 Montreal Gazette, February 16, 1973, Montreal Star, February 3, 1973, at A-3,
and Montreal Gazette, November 8, 1972 at 3.
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E. THE NEW REMEDY - CIVIL ACTIONS192
The Stage I amendments to the Combines Investigation Act (effective
January 1, 1976) provide for an entirely new remedy - the right of private
individuals or firms who have suffered financial damages as a result of con-
duct contrary to the Act to sue for single damages plus the costs of bringing
the action under s. 3LL It also provides this right for those damaged by the
failure of a firm to obey an order of prohibition of either a court or the Re-
strictive Trade Practices Commission. The significance of this section is that it
allows for the first time a breach of the statute to be the cause of a civil
action. In the Transport Oil v. Imperial Oil Ltd.193 and the Direct Lumber
Co. Ltd. v. Western Plywood Co. Ltd.194 cases the courts had previously ruled
that a civil action could not ensue from a violation of the Act. An important
element of s. 31.1 is subsection (2) which facilitates private enforcement of
the Act in that the record of successful criminal proceedings by the Depart-
ment of Justice and any evidence given in such proceedings is evidence in the
civil suit for damages. In such cases the plaintiff's energy will be directed to-
ward establishing the amount of damage suffered and not as to whether the
Act was violated. In order that legal proceedings be undertaken fairly prompt-
ly, s. 31.1 (4) provides that the civil suits must begin within two years of the
time the conduct occurred or whenever criminal proceedings were completed,
whichever is later.
Before attempting to appraise the potential impact of s. 31.1 we should
note that it represents a substantial retreat from what was proposed in the
Competition Act of June 1971. Section 55 of Bill C-256 (civil damages)
provided that persons who suffered loss or damage as a result of a violation
of the Act or a failure to obey an order of the Competitive Practices Tribunal
would sue for an amount equal to double the damage proved to have been
suffered by them. At the same time, s. 80 of the Competition Act permitted
the court to award double damages, upon application of those injured, in
addition to the usual criminal penalties. Pressure by business resulted in
s. 31.1 of the amended Combines Investigation Act which provides for single
damages plus costs in civil actions only.
What might be the potential impact of s. 31.1 ? First it creates a multiplicity
192 For the U.S. experience, see Lee Loevinger, Private Action - The Strongest
Pillar of Antitrust, (1958) 3 Antitrust Bulletin 167-77; Everette Macentyre, The Role
of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, (1962) 7 Antitrust Bulletin 113-29;
Robert A. Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions,
(1959) 4 Antitrust Bulletin; Charles A. Bane, The Electrical Equipment Conspiracies:
The Treble Damage Actions (New York: Federal Legal Publications, 1973); Walter
B. Erickson, The Profitability of Violating the Antitrust Laws: Dissolution and Treble
Damages in Private Antitrust, (1972) 5 Antitrust Law and Economics Review 101-18;
Alfred L. Parker, Treble Damage Action - A Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Viola-
tions?, (1971) 16 Antitrust Bulletin 483-505; Malcolm E. Wheeler, Antitrust Treble
Damage Actions: Do They Work?, (1973) 61 California Law No. 6 Rev. 1319-52;
E. Compton Timberlake, Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions (Mundelein, Ill.:
Callaghan and Co., 1965); Mathew P. Mitchell, Private Federal Antitrust Action (Cali-
fornia Continuing Education of the Bar, 1970).
193 [1935] O.R. 215; 2 D.L.R. 500.
194 (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 227; (1963), C.P.R. 9; (Appeal) 1962 S.C.R. 646;
(1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
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of interested parties with the power to enforce the Act. This is in contrast to
the 'single policeman' in the form of the Director of Investigation and Re-
search. Since the Act does not require that a criminal violation be proved
before a civil action is launched it seems reasonable that those most affected
by restraints of trade will both bring it to the attention of the Director and
begin civil actions of their own.
Secondly, s. 31.1 moves toward a restitution approach in that those
damaged by restraints of trade now stand to recoup amounts wrongfully ex-
tracted from them. Criminal fines take money from the offenders but transfer
it to the State - not to the victims.
Thirdly, should a significant number of civil suits be successful the effect
would be to increase the costs of perpetrating illegal restraints of trade and/or
increasing the probability of criminal connections since criminal actions may
follow civil actions for damages. Under the previously existing state of affairs
a dispassionate observer is hard put not to conclude that "crime pays," with
respect to restraints prohibited by the Combines Act. Civil suits may make
the benefit/cost ratio less favourable, if not less than one.
Now for the 'bad news'. Private civil actions resulting from violations of
the Combines Act will only be undertaken by business firms and public agen-
cies whose individual losses as a result of such restraints of trade are large in
absolute terms. Where the transfers from purchasers effected by the restraint
of trade are broadly distributed and individually small (as is the case for con-
sumer goods subject to resale price maintenance) the opportunity to collect
damages in civil actions is but an empty promise. This is true even if the ag-
gregate of the individually small claims is large indeed. It is for this reason
that class actions represent a much more practical remedy for final con-
sumers.0 5
Examining the case of the "big losers' and the calculus of their willing-
ness to launch single-damage civil actions, it can be seen that, in general,
they will not undertake such action unless the likely discounted real costs of
such action are less than the likely discounted real benefits. More formally
this can be expressed in the following inequality:
n Ct F Lt + Dt
t=O (l+r)t (l+r)t
where:
Ct = costs to the firm of investigation and legal action at period t
P, = probability of winning a civil suit
D t = damages awarded by the court at period t
Lt = investigation and legal costs awarded by the court at period t
r = rate of discount of future costs and revenues accruing to the firm i.e. the
firm's cost of capital
195For a general discussion see Neil J. Williams, Consumer Class Actions in
Canada - Some Proposals for Reform (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 1-88; Neil J.
Williams, Damages Class Actions Under the Combines Investigation Act and Jennifer
Whybrow, The Case for Class Actions in Canadian Competition Policy: An Economist's
Viewpoint, both in A Proposal for Class Actions Under Competition Policy Legislation,
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976).
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Several things should be noted about this problem. At all times D, Dt*,
where Dt* represents the true amount of damage suffered by the firm as a
result of the illegal restraint of trade. By definition, in s. 31.1(1) it can be
said that Lt -!-- Lt* where L* is the true total amount of investigation and
legal costs incurred by the firm. In other words, the plaintiff firm can never
be fully compensated for the loss it suffers and for the costs of obtaining re-
dress. Next, even when such compensation is received it is always received
some time after the losses/costs were actually incurred. Since "time is money,"
even an apparent full recovery, when it is delayed, is in present value terms,
a loss. Suppose a firm suffers $100,000 in damages today and recoups the
same amount four years later. Ignoring legal costs and their possible recovery,
and applying a discount rate of 12 per cent, the present value of the recovery
is only $63,552.
Returning to the inequality, note that any legal costs, in our civil suit
are a certainty and are incurred well before the date of reimbursement. More
importantly, it must be realized that the size of Lt and D, is uncertain as is
the fact of whether he wins the case, Le., Pw. Finally, the inequality does not
take into account the firm's risk propensity. As it is expressed, the inequality
is based on expected values and assumes risk neutrality. An example will il-
lustrate this point as well as the others discussed above.
Suppose a firm suffers a loss of $200,000 today as a result of an illegal
restraint of trade. The firm investigates and launches a legal action and in-
curs costs of $15,000 at the end of years 1, 2 and 3. If the firm's suit suc-
ceeds (probability = .7) the firm is awarded $70,000 in damages and $30,000
in costs at the end of the fourth year. Assuming a discount rate of 12 per
cent, these facts can be represented diagrammatically:
D* C. C2 C3 +70,000 = D4
+
-100,000 -15000 -15000 -15000 +30,000 = L,I I I I I
t=0 1 2 3 4
The firm's decision situation and net position can be seen in the follow-
ing diagram.
Decision Firm's net position9o
(present value at t = 0)
*not sue = -$100,000197
win case = -$ 72,475198
Pw = .7
*sue
- lose case = -$136,027199PL----3
196 The firm's net position recognizes the original loss of $100,000 due to the legal
restraint of trade, i.e. D* = - $100,000.
197 -$100,000 = 1.0 (-$100,000).
198 -$72,475 = -100,000 - 15,000(2.4018) + (70,000 + 30,000) (.63552).
199 -136,027 = -$100,000 - 15,000(2.4018).
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If the firm does not sue it suffers a certain loss of $100,000. If it sues and
wins, the firm's net loss in present value terms will be $72,475, so by winning
the case the firm is $27,525 better off. However, if the suit is unsuccessful
the firm is out the original $100,000 plus an additional $36,027. The total
expected value of taking the action to sue is
[.7(-72,475) + .3 (-136,027)] = - $91,541.
If the firm's decision makers are risk neutral, they will elect to sue because
the expected value of not suing is -$100,000. In terms of the example, it is
obvious that if the decision maker is only slightly risk averse he will not
undertake the civil suit.
Some tentative conclusions can be stated. The propensity of private par-
ties to begin civil actions will be strongly dependent on three variables:
1) their degree of risk aversion
2) the probability of winning a suit, which will depend very much
whether it has been preceded by a successful criminal action
3) the willingness of the courts to award full damages and costs and to
recognize the time-value of money in calculating the amounts they
award.
All of these variables would be much less important if the courts could award
double or treble damages as was proposed in C-256 and is the practice in the
U.S.200 Without such multiple damages the defendants in civil actions will say,
"Oh civil suit where is thy sting."
F. REFORMING THE PENALTIES AND REMEDIES
We have seen that a fairly wide range of potentially powerful penalties/
remedies exist with which to combat illegal restraints of trade in Canada. We
have also seen that a number of these penalties/remedies have never been
used at all or only rarely in the entire history of the legislation (changes in
tariffs, changes in patents or trademarks or their licences, structural remedies,
imprisonment). It also seems apparent that the formal penalties which have
been invoked (fines and prohibition orders), have been small relative to the
economic benefits of violating the law in respect of restraint of trade.
Our review of the fines in Canadian combines cases can only serve to
reinforce the idea that the fines have not been sufficiently large, in the words
of Brooke, J.A., "[T]o assure that there is no profit in the criminal conduct
in question." Since the morality and social stigma elements of combines of-
fences do not appear to offer non-monetary penalties, and since the other
remedies available under the Act are rarely invoked, society is dependent
2 0 0 Erickson, supra note 153 at 117, argues that even the availability of treble
damages in the U.S. is not an adequate deterrent when the probability of getting caught,
the proportion of sales and profits actually included in the treble damage calculation, the
time lag between violation and recovery and the size of damages likely to be assessed by
the judge are all taken into account. His analysis indicates "the violations will be found
profitable under virtually all reasonably realistic assumptions."
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upon fines as its method of deterrence, punishment and remedy. The historical
record clearly indicates that society's reliance on such a weapon is mis-
placed. Criminal fines have not deterred, they have not punished and they
have not provided a remedy - particularly to those directly affected by the
illegal restraints of trade.
Partly because of public perceptions of white collar crimes in general,
and restraint of trade offences in particular, and also because the economic
benefits of violating the law are usually so great, the informal weapon of pub-
licity has also had no apparent impact on violators or potential violators of
the anti-combines laws. We have also argued that the new remedy of single-
damage civil actions will be of no benefit to consumers adversely affected by
illegal restraints of trade. Such actions may be of modest benefit to larger
public and private entities whose absolute losses from restraints of trade will
encourage them to attempt to recoup part or all of their losses, including the
costs of bringing the action.
1. Public Attitudes Toward Restraint of Trade Offences - A Barrier to
Reform
Perhaps the most significant barrier to the reform of the penalties and
remedies in respect of illegal restraints of trade is the public perception of
white collar crime in general. Although the costs imposed on consumers of il-
legal restraints of trade (and other white collar crimes) probably far exceed
those resulting from conventional criminal behaviour,20 1 the society does not
take the former offences seriously if we look at our behaviour (as opposed
to rhetoric) toward them. Speaking to his private member's bill, which would
require the imprisonment of the executives of firms which were repeated of-
fenders of the Combines Investigation Act, David Orlikow (NDP - Winni-
peg North) correctly characterized the situation when he said:
How different is the treatment we mete out in this country to individuals, most
of them quite wealthy and important, who direct some of the largest companies
in Canada and who have consistently ignored the laws of Canada prohibiting
combines not once but three or more times. These people have been prosecuted
and convicted and have got off scotfree, the companies they direct being given a
fine of a few thousand dollars, an amount which is insignificant when compared
with the business done or the profits made.202
This differential approach to white collar crime in the form of combines
offences has been noted by at least one judge. In R. v. Electric Reduction
Company of Canada Ltd., Stark, J. pointed out that the penalty of imprison-
ment had never been imposed up to that time, and said "the comparative
smallness of the fines I suppose can only be explained in terms of a kind of im-
plicit judicial view which regarded anti-combines violation as being of some-
what lesser order of gravity than the commission of one of the so-called com-
mon crimes. That was reflected in the earlier state of this law when the maxi-
mum permissible fine was $10,000 in respect of a company."20
2ol Supra, note 126 at 145-47 and H. Miller, "Respectability Helps If You're a
Crook", Washington Post, July 7, 1974 at Bl, B3.
202 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1964 at 4012 (June 5, 1964).
2o3 Supra, note 37 at 237.
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Although offences against the Combines Investigation Act have always
been criminal offences, they carry little of the social stigma associated with
the notion of a crime as a morally blameworthy act. When it comes to crimes
such as murder, rape and arson, most people have no qualms about the social
reprehensibility of such acts and the fact that specific individuals should be
held responsible and suffer penal consequences, i.e., imprisonment. But what
about the man who arranges with other men to fix prices, prevent entry of a
potential rival or acquire a competitor? Are not businessmen, like lovers, in-
herently monopolists?204 Is price-fixing (even if done by elaborate overt ar-
rangements resulting in high prices and excessive profits) morally equivalent
to theft? It is apparent that most people simply do not equate the two. Yet
because of the constitutional problem in Canada, anti-combines legislation re-
sults only in criminal proceedings.2 05
Like other white collar or corporate crimes, offences in restraint of trade
are simply not taken as seriously, and hence not penalized as severely, as
breaking and entering or common assault. As we have seen, the state's sanc-
tions, almost entirely in the form of fines, have been small and ineffective.
Private social sanctions have been of a similar nature. For example, the con-
viction of a firm for a combines offence has probably never resulted in its
executives being requested to leave their clubs, shunned by polite society,
going on to being on the board of governors of a university or sitting in the
Senate of Canada. As Rosenbluth and Thorburn point out, the criminal nature
of our competition policy (until 1960 a number of the important legislative
provisions were in the Criminal Code itself) results in a cops and robbers' ap-
proach by making crimes (for which a businessman can go to prison) out of
economic acts not ordinarily considered to be crimes, either by businessmen,
or by the majority of the general public.206 One result is that when the evi-
dence is sufficiently overwhelming (e.g., minutes of meetings at which prices
have been fixed and markets carved-up) Canadian judges have convicted the
defendants. However, they often do so most reluctantly, pointing out the
"technical" nature of the offence and the fact that the executives involved
are clearly upstanding and respected members of the community who have
unwittingly gone astray.
Masten, l.A. in R. v. Container Materials Ltd. exemplified the judicial
reasoning which failed to condemn price-fixing conspiracies as morally blame-
worthy acts when he said:
I think it would be a mistake for this Court to look upon the appellants as guilty
of moral turpitude or of a wicked intention. Their directors are honourable men
desirous of conducting successfully the affairs of their respective companies, and
if in their efforts they have by mistake over-stepped the line set by Parliament
and have unduly lessened competition they are responsible for their unlawful act.
... Breach of the statute is one thing, moral turpitude is quite another.20 7
2 0 4 This phrase is attributable to the late Professor Sumner Slichter.
205As of January 1, 1976 civil procedures with respect to refusal to supply, con-
signment selling, exclusive dealing, tied selling and market restrictions were incorporated
into the Combines Investigation Act under Sections 31.2 to 31.4. It is expected that the
Stage H amendments will enlarge the scope of civil procedures.
200 Supra, note 21 at 9.
207 (1941), 3 D.L.R. 145 at 183; 76 C.C.C. 18 at 61.
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In the previous paragraph the judge had asserted that "stabilization of
widespread industry is no doubt lawful, and for that purpose some degree of
control may be essential even though it involves a lessening of competition to
a certain extent."208 In other words, controlling the industry via price-fixing
and market sharing are not morally reprehensible acts, and only become tech-
nical infractions of the law when they cross over the line between due and
undue restraints of trade. Masten, J.A. seemed oblivious to the fact that this
was a most elaborate and comprehensive price-fixing, market sharing cartel,
in operation for at least eight years. New entrants and rogue members who
threatened the price structure of the cartel were bought up at inflated prices
(reflecting both the potential monopoly profits and their nuisance value). The
cartel's success was manifest. In 1931 the 16 companies showed a net loss
as a group. By 1937 the average rate of return on invested capital was 16.7
per cent; from 1934 through 1937 no manufacturing firm incurred any
losses. The cartel made it profitable for firms not to produce. One received
almost $60,000 over two years for refraining from producing when its plant
was valued at less than half that amount.
In the same vein (businessmen as pillars of the community), Conserva-
tive M.P. Bill Kempling (Hamilton-Wentworth) obviously finds it hard to
imagine businessmen as criminals:
In my business experience I have met businessmen from all walks of life. The vast
majority are honest, sincere, law-abiding people. They contribute greatly to the
economic and cultural life of Canada. They are proud of their achievements in
business and the part they play in the life of the community. You will find them
at various times of the week at Rotary, Lions, Optimists or Kinsmen clubs per-
forming a public service to their community. o9
More recently, Conservative M.P. Sinclair Stevens asserted that,
"[N]inety-nine per cent of the businessmen are honest and never get into
criminal situations."2 10 This type of reasoning recalls Ralph Nader's retort,
"Do you give credit to a burgier, because he doesn't burglarize 99 per cent
of the time?" The preservation of this mythology is at least partly dependent
upon the reluctance of public officials to prosecute 'reputable' businessmen.
The diffidence with which the federal Department of Justice pursues
combines offences is illustrated by the fact that as a matter of policy the
Crown has not laid charges under the Criminal Code or Combines Investiga-
tion Act against an individual except when that person was carrying on busi-
ness in his own name.211 The result is the ludicrous spectacle of corporations
(legal, not natural persons) being convicted for conspiring to fix prices while
the agents of the corporation who make the decisions and carry out the legal
208Id. at 183 (D.L.R.); 60-61 (C.C.C.).
209 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1974 at 714 (March 20, 1974).
210 Montreal Gazette, April 11, 1975 at 6. This conclusion is severely challenged by
Colin IL Goff, "Corporate Crime in Canada", M.A. Thesis, Dept. of Sociology, Uni-
versity of Calgary, November, 1975.
211 On occasion the Crown has prosecuted individuals closely associated with price-
fixing conspiracies as well as the corporate entities involved. In such cases, the in-
dividuals were usually the organizers of the trade association which facilitated the
conspiracy.
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entity's business go free.212 In fairness it should be pointed out that the policy
of the Crown to charge legal rather than natural persons is a fairly general
one for other criminal offences involving corporations.
Even the judges recognize the lack of social stigma associated with con-
victions for restraint of trade. The words of Lerner, J. in the Armco case are
instructive:
Realistically it cannot be said that the stigma of conviction and penalty to a large
corporation, or even some smaller corporations, will reflect unfavourably on their
corporate images in the business world or with the consumer public which, in the
final analysis, this whole process is designed to protect. However, on occasion,
unfortunately, relatively unimportant personal offenders or small businessmen
operating as one shareholder corporations may suffer consequences out of all pro-
portion to those suffered by the large impersonal corporations whose executive
officers and guiding personalities are relatively anonymous.
It is a sad commentary on our society that leadership and morality cannot come
with some consistency from those most capable of exemplifying same. The non-
violent offender, such as the thief, the embezzler, the fraudulent operator, the
shoplifter, to name a few, can understandably take a cynical view of his or her
condemnation by society when the institutionalized virtuosity of "big business"
can engage in painstaking, time-consuming, devious schemes which give the ap-
pearance of legality to that which they must know is not only contrary to the law
but at the expense of the too often unsuspecting public.a3
In his recent study, Deterring Corporate Crime, Gilbert Geis outlines
a number of prerequisites to imposing heavier sanctions on corporate of-
fenders. The first "involves the development of a deepening sense of moral
outrage on the part of the public. '2 14 This is inhibited by the fact that the
costs of corporate crime are highly diffused over a large number of victims.
Most price fixing conspiracies are rarely noticed by the victims as thousands
of consumers each pay a small absolute amount more. It is precisely this
fact, that makes the organization of an effective consumer interest group im-
possible without external assistance. On the unlikely chance that corporate
officials are charged there is the problem of getting a conviction and a signi-
cant sentence. Geis points out that "the judge who tries and sentences the
... official was probably brought up in the same social class as the offender,
and often shares the same economic views. '215 White collar criminals also
benefit from two prevalent but contradictory community beliefs. "Neighbors
of the corporate criminal often regard him as upright and steadfast ... at the
same time there is a cynicism among others about white-collar crime in
general, a cynicism rooted in beliefs that the practices are so pervasive and
endemic that reformative efforts are helpless."216
212 There are a number of problems associated with charging individuals. If all the
culpable individuals were charged in a conspiracy case, the Crown, being unable to call
them as witnesses, might find it impossible to prove the offence beyond a reasonable
doubt from the documentary evidence. If some conspirators are charged and others are
not because they assist the Crown by testifying the matter of equity is obvious - should
only singing birds be rewarded?
213 Supra, note 9 at 149-50.
214 Gilbert Geis, "Deterring Corporate Crime," in R. Nader and M. Green (eds.),
Corporate Power in America (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973) at 185.
215 Id. at 186.
210 Id. at 186-87.
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The growing willingness to hold individual executives responsible for
their actions as corporate officials may signify a change in the public's atti-
tude toward white collar/corporate crime. This idea will be explored in more
detail below.
In all, we have painted a gloomy picture of the existing state of affairs.
What could be offered by way of a more positive approach to the problem
of effective penalties and remedies for offences in restraint of trade?
2. Holding Individuals Responsible
The reason that the organizers of illegal restraints of trade in Canada
have not gone to jail is that very few have been charged. And where they
have been convicted, the Crown has not asked that businessmen convicted
be put in jail. For example, in R. v. Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd., in his
reasons for sentence, Spence, J. notes:
Counsel for the Crown expressly refrained from asking for any sentence of im-
prisonment as to [the two individuals charged] and with that view the Court
agrees.2 17
Yet later in his judgment Mr. Justice Spence described Mr. Turgeon as "very
active in the conspiracy and had supported it enthusiastically and with con-
siderable vigour ... "218 He went on to say,
Mr. Ivan Moffitt, the other individual accused was perhaps the most active single
person in furthering the conspiracy, at any rate at the merchant level, and indeed
its management must have taken a very considerable portion of his time and its
fees must have supplied a considerable part of his income.2' 9
Both men were fined the maximum amount at that time for individuals under
the Criminal Code - $4,000.
The Department of Justice can begin by taking off its kid gloves and
laying charges against individual executive officers of corporations involved
in combines offences. This will require a change in the Department's general
policy of not charging individuals for offences involving corporate entities,
except under unusual circumstances. The corporate veil must be torn away
and recognition given to the fact that men, not legal entities, fix prices, divide
markets, negotiate mergers and administer resale price maintenance schemes.
The time has come to stop the denial of individual responsibility.
At least one judge has recognized the anomaly of charging corporations
and not individuals. McBride, J. noted that corporations are "artificial legal
entities" and that "each one acts through human agency, officers, directors
and others, men who direct the corporation's course of conduct and see that
it is carried into effect."'220 He went on to issue a warning to corporate execu-
tives involved in combines offences:
The officers of the accused ... and any others like-minded who may be operating
in a similar manner ... need a blunt and stern warning. The operation of s. 498
217 (1954), 109 C.C.C. 213 at 214.
2 18 Id. at 219-20.
219 Id. at 220.
22 (1951), 3 W.W.R. (N.S.) 289 at 319; 13 C.R. 63 at 95; 101 C.C.C. 22 at 56.
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of the Code is not confined to corporations; under it individuals may be and
have been charged and convicted in the past. These men will do well to mend their
ways. They need not feel comfortably secure behind their corporations. The arm
of the law is long enough to reach out to them. If there be a conviction of any
individual the punishment is not necessarily a fine, each convicted individual
stands in the shadow of a jail sentence ... let them pay regard hereafter to the
rules laid down by Parliament for the regulation of their corporations. 221
Recently, the Bureau of Competition Policy has been paying more than
lip-service to the notion that individual executives should be held accountable
for combines crimes.222 As a general policy, Bureau officials now intend to
proceed against individuals where the evidence is sufficient and may suggest
the imposition of prison sentences where appropriate.
A few Opposition M.P.'s have called for the prosecution and jailing of
individuals involved in combines offences. Arguing that fines of $25,000 or
$5,000 were not effective punishment to deter corporations from combines
offences, Real Caouette, Leader of the Creditistes, stated in 1963:
... there is a way to prevent trusts and cartels from exploiting the Canadian
people. When we are confronted with the man responsible for a trust on sugar
or some other commodity - let us amend the legislation so as to put him be-
hind bars for 10 years.225
David Orlikow, has every year since 1963, introduced a private members bill
proposing stronger penalties. In 1964 he likened combines offences to steal-
ing from a super-market and went on to say, "I suggest that the same kind
of treatment [imprisonment] should be meted out to the company directors,
to the members of the Ridean Club or the Manitoba Club in Winnipeg, who
are among the most respected people in the country ... as is meted out to
poor people who find it necessary to commit much smaller crimes. 224
In a message to Congress in 1914, in which he proposed what was to
become the Clayton Act, President Woodrow Wilson advocated that, "the
penalties and punishments should fall not upon business itself, to its confu-
sion and interruption, but upon the individuals who use the instrumentalities
of business to do things which public policy and sound business practice con-
demn. Every act of business is done at the command or upon the initiative of
some ascertainable person or group of persons. These should be held indivi-
dually responsible, and the punishment should fall upon them, not upon the
business organization of which they make illegal use.' '225
There are a number of arguments in support of the prosecution of indi-
viduals for illegal restraints of trade. First, as we have noted, corporations
are purely legal entities which can only operate through natural persons. By
proceeding only against legal entities we maintain the artificiality of the face-
221 Id. at 320.
222 On June 23, 1976 in Toronto an Information was laid against Barton Tubes Ltd.
et al and Bruce C. McLeod, General Manager of Barton Tubes in respect of Section
32 (1) (c).
223 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1963 at 5842, (December 13, 1963).
224 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1964 at 4012, (June 5, 1964).
225 Congressional Record, Vol. 51, 1914 at 1963.
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less corporate organization. Second, only individuals can properly be regard-
ed as culpable and as such subject to criminal sanctions. Third, fines, parti-
cularly of the size levied in combines cases to date, do not deter corporate
crime. Charging individuals, particularly high status individuals, will increase
the personal cost of engaging in illegal restraints of trade. Fourth, the failure
to prosecute the businessmen/organizers of corporate crime engenders dis-
respect for the whole system of criminal justice. In the U.S., the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice put it this
way:
White-collar crime affects the whole moral climate of our society. Derelictions
by corporations and their managers, who usually occupy leadership positions in
their communities, establish an example which tend to erode the moral base of
the law ...226
This emphasis on individual responsibility is part of a much more widespread
phenomenon of holding accountable individual decision-makers. As a recent
article in Business Week put it, "the shield that protects [corporate managers]
from individual accountability for corporate acts of negligence and lawlessness
seems far less impregnable than it used to be."22 7
U.S. Attorney-General William Saxbe has remarked, "Executives are
not in the throes of an irresistible impulse when they fix prices ... they vio-
late the law deliberately." 228 The U.S. Assistant Attorney-General for the
Antitrust Division, Thomas E. Kauper has stated, "I tend to view [price-
fixing] as a crime ... and I don't think we have a lot of discretion when
we're dealing with crime." 229 In other words, individuals should be charged
with restraint of trade offences.
The next logical step is that when individuals are found guilty in such
cases the Crown should recommend jail sentences as well as fines. 230 They
should not recommend fines in lieu of prison sentences. As a Vancouver Sun
editorial put it after the fines were imposed in R. v. Ocean Construction Sup-
plies Ltd.23 1 cases, "why the Department of Justice should stay its hand in
this regard is difficult to understand. If the objective of prosecution is to deter
other possible conspirators, then jail is obviously more effective than a mone-
tary penalty. '282
In early 1976 the U.S. Department of Justice had at least ninety price-
fixing cases before grand juries. Kauper is quoted as saying, "[M]e have
226 Supra, note 214 at 183.
227 'The Law Closes in On Managers," Business Week, May 10, 1976 at 110.
228 Time, November 11, 1974 at 65.
229 Quoted in 'Price-Fixing: Crackdown underway", Business Week, June 2, 1974
at 42.
230We make this recommendation recognizing the fact that imprisonment is a
socially costly undertaking. Gary Becker has argued that because of these costs, and
because less socially expensive penalty-deterrents are available, imprisonment should be
used only very rarely for any criminal offence. See his Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach (1968), 76 Journal of Political Economy 169.
2 31 Supra, note 10.
232 "Don't do it again", Vancouver Sun, March 13, 1974 at 4.
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every intention of seeking felony indictments and recommending prison sen-
tences for individuals convicted of price-fixing violations. '233
Geis has emphasized the effectiveness of imprisonment as a deterrent in
this context:
Jail terms have a self-evident deterrent impact on corporate officials, who belong
to a social group that is exquisitely sensitive to status deprivation and censure. The
white collar offender and his business colleagues, more than the narcotic addict or
the ghetto mugger, are apt to learn well the lesson intended by a prison term. 234
Given the conservative nature of the Canadian judiciary, it is entirely
possible that the judges will be unwilling to put businessmen in jail. Should
this be the result, Parliament will have to legislate mandatory prison sen-
tences for executives convicted of violations of the Combines Investigation
Act. As the Vancouver Sun argued in an editorial on combines penalties,
"The law must be written in a manner that leaves no option, as it does now,
for less than 'equal' punishment of the guilty corporate officer." 235
In reply to David Orlikow's proposal to impose mandatory jail sentences
on individuals convicted of combines offences, Liberal M.P. Robert Stanbury
(York - Scarborough) objected on the grounds that they restricted the court's
discretion and were "inconsistent with the whole trend of current philosophy
relating to minimum penalties in criminal law."236 Speaking to the 1968 ver-
sion of Mr. Orlikow's private members bill, Liberal M.P. H. E. Stafford
(Elgin) seemed incapable of viewing businessmen involved in illegal con-
straints of trade as criminals. He said that Orlikow's bill "violates the whole
philosophy of the anti-combines legislation... one would be inclined to think
that businessmen and individuals . . . are potential criminals and that they
should be dealt with severely, because the companies they manage [violate]
the laws relating to combines and monopolies. '23 7
Until recently, the jailing of business executives for antitrust violations
in the U.S. has been a rare occurrence. Hamilton and Till point out that in
the first five decades of the Sherman Act, only one "respectable man of busi-
ness [went] to jail.m8 It was not until the late 1950's that the first jail sen-
tence was imposed in a pure price fixing case. During the 1950's in the U.S.
corporate officials were named as defendants in 39 per cent of all criminal
antitrust suits. Thirty-nine received jail sentences and twelve served terms of
one to six months.239 Green reports that between 1890 and 1970, 461 indivi-
dual defendants were sentenced to prison under the U.S. antitrust laws.240
233 Quoted in Business Week, May 10, 1976 at 112.
2 34 Supra, note 214 at 182-83.
235 "That double standard", Vancouver Sun, October 9, 1974 at 4.
230 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1966, at 9583, (November 4, 1966).
The Liberal M.P. is no relation to the author.
237 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1968 at 7704, (March 15, 1968).
23 8 Walton Hamilton and Irene Till, Antitrust in Action, TNEC Monograph No. 16,
1941 at 79.
239 R. W. Whiting, "Antitrust and the Corporate Executive" (1961), 47 Virginia
L.R. 943 at 986.
2 4o Supra, note 157 at 167.
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Posner indicates that in all but twenty-six criminal cases between 1890 and
1969 the sentences were immediately suspended. Only three of the men going
to jail were involved in pure price-fixing arrangements, i.e., their offences did
not involve labour racketeering violence.241 Green states that the total amount
of time spent in jail by all businessmen who have violated the antitrust laws
is a little under two years. Yet the electrical conspiracy alone robbed the
public more than all other robberies and thefts in 1961 combined.2 2 In that
case, the longest sentence was thirty days.
The U.S. judges have shown some imagination in sentencing business
executives.
In a case involving price-fixing by nine paper-label companies decided
in San Francisco in the Fall of 1974, U.S. District Judge Charles B. Renfrew
sentenced the firms to pay fines of $10,000 to $50,000 each and eight execu-
tives were fined from $4,000 to $15,000. In addition, the executives were
required to make speeches before twelve public and business groups each on
the evils of price-fixing.&2 43 One of the executives involved is quoted as say-
ing "We never had any thoughts of ourselves as being thieves ... we simply
said we would not use our prices against competitors." When asked whether
he thought this was illegal he replied, "Of course, I always knew I was plac-
ing myself in jeopardy. But I felt the possibility of getting caught was so
small it was worth the risk. '244
Jailing business executives would sharply increase the personal cost of
committing restraint of trade offences. In designing the penalties we do not
recommend jail sentences for reason of moral righteousness, but because it
would thereby increase the cost to the individuals who participate in illegal
restraints of trade and should reduce their willingness to perpetrate the offence.
With remarkable frankness, some price-fixers admit they consciously flout the law,
balancing the risk of discovery against a dependable gain in sales or profits.
Others rationalize their actions on the grounds that their enterprises or jobs would
be in mortal danger without anti-competitive price agreements.245
Exhortation is commendable, 46 but placing the responsibility for re-
straints of trade directly upon those who carry them out will be more effective.
There seems to be a desire in other situations to hold individual executives
2 41 Supra, note 157 at 167.
242 Supra, note 157 at 169. By late 1975 the U.S. Department of Justice indicated
that 46 individuals had served jail terms, about one-half in the previous three years.
Current policy requires the investigating officials to justify not indicting individuals
suspected of knowingly violating the law on per se offences.
243 The executives were originally sentenced to jail, but the sentence was suspended
in return for their appearances on the lecture circuit. "How to avoid antitrust", Business
Week, January 27, 1975 at 84.
in return for their appearances on the lecture circuit. "How to avoid antitrust", Business
Week, January 27, 1975 at 84.
244 Business Week, June 2, 1975 at 48.
245 Id. at 42.
246 For a superb example see the editorial, "What happened to integrity?" Financial
Post, March 22, 1975.
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personally responsible for their acts on behalf of the enterprise. 247 Our pro-
posal is consistent with this more general attitude.
3. Increasing the Level of Fines
Fines levied upon corporations for restraint of trade offences must be
raised to the point where it becomes unprofitable to break the law. The Eco-
nomic Council in its Interim Report on Competition Policy put the matter
this way: "Fines to be meaningful, should be large enough to hurt, having
regard to the size of the enterprise or enterprises involved." 248
Stigler et al. point out that a purely remedial sanction does not provide
deterrence ... "that is why punishment by fine or imprisonment is an appro-
priate sanction for illegal price-fixing it provides deterrence." 249 The Task
Force recommended that the U.S. Department of Justice seek an upward re-
vision in fines. Because many anti-trust offences are concealable, the Task
Force argued,
... the fines must be increased to a point where they will give even the large
corporation considerable pause before participating in (or condoning its officers'
individual participation) an illegal conspiracy.2 50
The appropriate level of fines must take into account five factors. The first
involves an assessment of the increase in net profits (or other benefits re-
sulting from the illegal restraint of trade. Secondly, one must consider the
probability of detection, prosecution, and conviction. Fines, on average, must
significantly exceed the incremental benefit of the offence to account for the
odds of not getting caught. Third, in economic terms, even though the point
is not recognized in most criminal cases, the size of the fines should take into
account the fact they are paid some time after the benefits have been received.
The economic benefits of illegal restraints of trade must not take on the char-
acter of interest free loans. Fourth, in addition to the part of the fine designed
to tax off the benefits of the illegal acts, there should be a provision for a puni-
247 Very recently in Minneapolis a judge fined a roofing company $300 for a pollu-
tion offence and then ordered the firm to produce one of its officers to serve a 30-dayjail sentence. "The judge said he didn't care which officer it was, since he considered all
of them legally responsible for the firm's activities." (Vancouver Sun, "Firm to Appeal
Order to Jail An Executive", April 19, 1976 at 24.) In France, in March 1976, an
executive of a building company was charged with involuntary homicide when two
labourers were killed in an industrial accident. In October, 1975 the manager of a state-
owned asphalt plant was jailed for two days following an investigation of the death of
a worker crushed between two railroad cars. These and a number of similar cases in
France have caused some concern. The president of a U.S.-controlled company in France
was quoted as saying, "There is a fear psychosis among managers now . . .any fluky
accident can cost you a prison record." The president of the Bendix subsidiary stated,
"I think this is coming to the U.S." Business Week, March 29, 1976 at 48-49.
For an example of the U.S. Department of Justice's attempt to hold individual corporate
executives responsible for violations of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act see "Executive
liability faces its big test", Business Week, February 24, 1975 at 102.
248 Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1969 at 191.
249 Report on the Task Force on Productivity and Competition, supra at 33.
250 Id. at 33.
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tive component, at the discretion of the court, to ensure that the net financial
position of the corporation is worsened as a result of its violation of the law.
Only with such fines is it possible to talk of deterrence in a practical sense.
Shareholders, who would otherwise be the putative beneficiaries of an illegal
restraint of trade, should be penalized when their firm is involved in an of-
fence. The responsibilities of ownership should be made apparent. Finally,
we must recognize the element of risk aversion in the decision making of
business executives. The greater the degree of risk aversion, ceteris paribus,
the smaller the potential fine need be to deter illegal behaviour. This essen-
tially economic approach to antitrust penalties is somewhat different from that
inherent in the factors considered by Canadian judges in combines cases out-
lined supra. Their focus on deterrence and the protection of the public in-
terest must be combined with the recognition that the behaviour we wish to
deter is economic behaviour. The decision to engage in price-fixing resale
price-maintenance or other illegal restraint of trade is not one of impulse,
moral failure, or deprived socio-economic conditions. It is, by and large, one
based on an implicit calculation of costs and benefits and the associated risks.
We must change the relative size of the expected payoffs to deter socially un-
desirable business behaviour.
Green proposes to increase corporate fines "so that up to 10 per cent of
the corporations sales receipts for the years of the indictment could be as-
sessed. A minimum fine of 1 per cent or $100,000, whichever is higher,
would be levied, so as to strip judges of some of their historic abuse of discre-
tion. The minimum would increase to 5 per cent or $500,000 for a corpora-
tion convicted of a second offence within a five-year period.
'251
Breit and Elzinga offer a different proposal to determine the appropriate
size of corporate fines in antitrust cases. They argue that given that execu-
tives are generally risk averse and that imprisonment and private "reparations"
suits consume too much in the way of society's scarce resources, "that anti-
trust violations be penalized exclusively by a mandatory fine of 25 per cent
of the firm's pre-tax profits for every year of anti-competitive activity." They
continue, "The 25 per cent figure would ... not seem so high as to cause
violators to go out of business, and not so onerous as to offend society's sense
of absolute equity.'" 2
Breit and Elzinga's proposal is much more attractive in terms of the
simplicity criterion and also in terms of the ease with which the fines could
be calculated. We would not, however, go so far as to substitute it for all
2 51 Supra, note 126 at 175. He also proposes a mandatory minimum prison term
of four months for individuals on the first offence and one year for the second. But his
proposals for penalties and remedies go far beyond these two points - at 174-77. If
Green's proposals seem severe consider what was proposed in the Hart-Scott antitrust
bill: "it mandates forfeiture to the federal government of all property involved in [an
antitrust] violation." Business Week, June 14, 1976 at 44.
252 William Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward
Risk: An Economic Analysis (1973), 86 Harvard L. Rev. 711.
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other penalties for restraint of trade violations as they wish to do.253 As a
practical legislative proposal we would be quite happy to endorse it in con-
junction with fines and jail terms for executives found guilty of combines
offences.
4. More Effort on Enforcement
A substantial increase in the effort devoted to the detection and prose-
cution of restraint of trade cases should be made. The objective of such an
effort is to increase the probability of conviction, ceteris paribus, and hence
reduce the expected pay-off of engaging in illegal trade practices. Breit and
Elzinga demonstrate that if business decision-makers are risk averters the
deterrent effect of a policy of a low probability of conviction with high man-
datory fines is greater than a policy of a higher probability of conviction with
lower mandatory fines. This is true, it has been proved, even when the ex-
pected value of the two policies is identical. 25 4 While Breit and Elzinga are
technically correct, the practical significance of their policy recommendation
is greatly exaggerated. It can be shown that even if there is a ten-fold differ-
ence in the probability of conviction, the maximum mandatory fine is equal
to the additional profits from committing the offence, and that decision-
makers are highly risk averse, the difference in the expected utilities under
either policy is very small. In other words, the government can increase its
antitrust deterrent by either raising fines or by increasing the probability of
conviction, ceteris paribus.
The Economic Council argued that publicity and the program of com-
pliance must be "supported by the widespread belief that infractions of the
law stand a heavy risk of being detected and proceeded against and for this
to exist there must be a credibly vigorous and comprehensive program of
enforcement."2 5 The Report continued, "From the points of view of both
deterrence and equity, it is not good for people to think that either they or
others have a considerable chance of getting away with it.' '256
To increase the probability of conviction the Bureau of Competition
Policy will have to develop more sophisticated methods of detecting illegal
restraints of trade. By and large, the agency has begun its investigations in
response to complaints from individuals and firms affected by the alleged of-
fence. The Director has regularly monitored the business environment through
newspapers, the trade press, and the program of compliance. This must be
supplemented by a more theoretically-based, active search for violations of
the Act. In recent years both the manpower and complementary resources of
the Bureau have been considerably expanded. However, the total number of
cases brought before the courts (excluding those for misleading advertising)
2 5 3 Breit and Elzinga would substitute their mandatory fine of 25 percent of profits
for all of the following: imprisonment or fines levied upon executives, private treble
damage actions, and increased resources for antitrust enforcement designed to increase
the probability of conviction.254 Supra, note 235 at 699-703.
255 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1969) at 190.
256 Id. at 190-91.
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has been small - some 91 between April 1960 and March 1975. The num-
ber of cases in recent years has not kept up with the increase in the Bureau's
manpower. 257 Perhaps the quality of the personnel needs to be upgraded or
improvements made in the management of investigations and prosecutions.
5. Class Actions and Treble Damages
As they were enacted effective January 1, 1976, the provisions for civil
damage actions, we have argued, will be ineffective in seeing that customers
will be paid "reparations" for illegal restraints of trade. The remedy for this
seems obvious. Permit class actions. This is precisely what is advocated by
Williams in his study for the Stage 11 amendments to the Combines Investiga-
tion Act.258 Recently the U.S. House of Representatives passed a parens pat-
riae bill permitting states to bring class actions on behalf of consumers and
other groups affected by antitrust violations. "A more sweeping bill will be
approved soon by the Senate Judiciary Committee." 259
We also argued that even for "big losers", single damage civil suits may
not provide much benefit to those hurt by restraints of trade or much deter-
rent to those who commit them. The difficulties with such suits could be most
easily overcome by allowing the courts to award double or treble damages.
In the U.S., civil suits have been possible since the passage of the Sherman
Act in 1890, and treble damages since the Clayton Act of 1914. The latter
are only possible following a criminal conviction, and not following nolo con-
tendere pleas or consent orders. In any event, there has been an explosion of
civil suits for treble damages as the following data show:
260
Period Number of Private Antitrust Average Number






1963 1700 1700 (Electrical
1969 740 740 equipment cases)
1972 1299 1299
1973 1152 1152
Currently, the number of private suits outnumber those filed by the Antitrust
Division by a ratio of twenty to one. One U.S. attorney specializing in pri-
vate antitrust suits argues, "Private antitrust decisions are the last bastion of
257 Supra, note 25.
258 Williams, supra, note 195.
259 "New Weapon for Antitrusters", Business Week, April 5, 1976 at 113. For
earlier reports on class actions in the U.S. in Business Week see, February 23, 1974 at
33; June 9, 1975 at 86-87; May 11, 1974 at 61, 63 and December 15, 1973. The ques-
tion of whether foreign governments can sue for treble damages under the 1914 Clayton
Act is discussed in "When foreign nations sue under antitrust," Business Week, February
24, 1975 at 26.
260 Business Week, Aug. 12, 1972, at 51-52; Mar. 23, 1974, at 49, 54 and Everette
MacIntyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement (1962), 7 Anti-
trust Bulletin at 113-29.
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hope against a completely managed economy ... Today, it is private legisla-
tion rather than government legislation that constitutes the most effective
deterrent. '2 1 He attributes the rise in private suits to the failure of the gov-
ernment to act and "the private sector has filled the vacuum." Business atti-
tudes are different. "Management is now result-oriented rather than concern-
ed about being accepted at the club."262 Similar reasons are described by
Business Week:
Dr. Irwin M. Stelzer, president of National Economic Research Associates, Inc.,
a large antitrust-oriented consulting firm, explains that private suits began to
increase markedly following the electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy cases
in the early 1960s. State public utility commissions said, in effect, that if utilities
had a remedy for overcharges as a result of antitrust violations but failed to bring
suit to recover, the commission would not approve rate increases to cover the
losses. The same principle applied to all corporations: Failure to pursue antitrust
remedies could subject them to stockholder derivative suits. So, according to
Stelzer, what had seemed to the big names in the antitrust bar as seamy litigation
far beneath their notice, like chasing ambulances, suddenly became necessary and
glamorous.2 03
Whatever the reason, private suits are paying off for something like one-half
the plaintiffs. Some large awards are being made. Bane indicates that by
April 1964 General Electric had settled 90 per cent of the private suits against
it for $160 million. Since G.E. was able to persuade the government to allow it
to deduct the full amount for tax purposes its net earnings in 1964 were re-
duced from $312 million to $237.3 million or from $3.44 to $2.62 per
share.204 Business Week indicates that "city and state hospitals have collected
more than $100-million from tetracycline manufacturers for claimed over-
charges stemming from an alleged conspiracy among drug companies." In the
plumbing fixture industry private claimants received more than $25 million.265
In the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone &
Electronics Corporations and Hawaiian Telephone Company case, Attorney
Maxwell Blecher was able to obtain divestiture relief for a private plaintiff for
the first time in U.S. history.266
All of this suggests that if the amount of damages in civil suits is in-
creased to the U.S. level, then civil enforcement of the Combines Investiga-
Act may become a most significant remedy and deterrent.26 If this nation's
record on combines matters is any guide one should not be sanguine about the
prospects of getting legislation allowing private treble-damage suits.
201 "The antitrust specialist and dragon slayer", Business Week, May 12, 1973
at 120.
262 "Is John Sherman's antitrust obsolete", Business Week, March 23, 1974 at 54.
263 Id. See, also, 'Trustbusting: A New Role for Companies", Business Week,
August 12, 1972 at 51-53.
204 Charles A. Bane, supra, note 192 at 250-51.
205 Aug. 12, 1972 at 52.
266 Business Week, May 12, 1973 at 120.
267The economic efficiency of treble damage suits has been questioned in Williams
Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The
Uneasy Case for Treble Damages (1974), 17 Journal of Law and Economics 329.
The efficacy of treble damage actions as a deterrent to antitrust violations has been
questioned by Erickson, Wheeler, and Parker, supra, note 153.
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Table 2
Combines Investigation Act Maximum Fines and Prison Terms
as of Jan. 1, 1976
Offence
- horizontal conspiracies (Sec. 32)
- foreign directives (32.1)
- bid rigging (32.2)
- conspiracy relating to
professional sport (32.3)
Penalty
Indiv: $1,000,000 or 5 years or both
Corp: $1,000,000
Corp: fine at the discretion of the court
(only)
Indiv: fine at the discretion of the court
or 5 years or both
Corp: fine at the discretion of the court
Same as Sec. 32.2
- mergers and monopoly (33) Indiv: fine at discretion of court or
2 years
Corp: fine at discretion of court
- Price discrimination/Predatory Same as Sec. 33
pricing (34)
- Misleading advertising (36 - (a) Conviction on indictment:
includes materially misleading Indiv: fine at discretion of court
representations and those as to or 5 years or both
price) Corp: fine at discretion of court
(b) summary conviction
Indiv: $25,000 or 1 year or both
Corp: $25,000
- Representations as to tests and same as Sec. 36
testimonials (36.1)
- Double ticketing (36.2) summary conviction:
Indiv: $10,000 or 1 year or both
Corp: $10,000
- Pyramid selling (36.3) same as Sec. 36
- Referral selling (36.4) same as Sec. 36
- Sales above advertised prices summary conviction:
(37.1) Indiv: $25,000 or 1 year or both
Corp: $25,000
- Promotional contests (37.2) same as Sec. 36
- RPM/Refusal to supply (38) same as Sec. 32.2
[VCOL. 14, No. 3
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Table 3
Size of Fines in Conspiracy Cases
1889-1975
No. ofFirms4/
Total Largest Indiv. Cost of
Case Section Date fines fine Convicted Prosecution
R. v. Elliott (Pres. of Ontario 520 April $4,000 $4,000 0/1 n.a.
Coal Assoc.) 1903 suspended suspended
R. v. Master Plumbers and Steam 520 Dec. 10,000 5,000 2/0 n.a.
Fitters Cooperative Assoc. et al. 1905
R. v. McGuire et al. (Ontario plumbing 520 Jan. 10,000 500 0/38 n.a.
and heating) 1906
R. v. McMichael 520 June 250 250 0/1 n.a.
1907
R. v. Clarke (Pres. of Alberta Retail 498 Nov. 500 500 0/1 n.a.
Lumber Dealers Assoc.) 1907
R. v. Stinson-Reeb Builders' Supply Co. 498 Jan. 6,000 2,000 3/0 n.a.
Ltd. et al. (gypsum products, plasterers 1926
assoc.)
Amalgamated Builders' Council 498 May & 26,500 10,000 1/13(plumbing supplies) June
1930
R. v. Singer et al. (plumbing supplies 498 & Mar., 17,600 8,000 0/5
includes Belyea and Weintraub) Sec. 2 Au'l $39,3271
of CIA &Mune ~ 3,2
1931
R. v. White et al. (plumbing supplies) 498 & April 1,100 100 0/11Sec. 2 1932J
of CIA
Electrical Estimators Assoc. (Toronto 498 Jan. 26,200 2,500 7/15 n.a.
electrical contractors, i.e. R. v. 1932 (later







Canadian Basket Pool 498 Jan. 1,500 100 0/15 Justice
1933
Anthracite Coal Importers (R. v. 498 Dec. 30,000 7,000 5/0 n.a.
Canadian Import Co. et al) 1933
R. v. Harit and Adair Co. Ltd. 498 Jan. 13,500 5,000 5/0 n.a.(anthracite coal) 1935
Container Materials 498 Sept. 6 159,000 10,000 19/1 47,0951
1940
W. C. Macdonald Inc. (Tobacco 32 Jul. 26 15,000 15,000 1/0 42,0341
mfg. & wholesalers, 1941
part Imperial Tobacco case)
H. J. Badden Bathurst Power & Paper 498 Mar. 17,000 5,000 4/1 See Container(Shipping Material Assoc.) 1942 Materials
Hobbs Glass 498 Oct. 6 44,000 10,000 8/1 17,825'
1950
McGavin Bakeries 498 Oct. 2 20,000 10,000 6/0 111,156'
1951
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 498 Sept.24 50,000* 10,000 5/0 34,9271(mechanical rubber goods) 1953
Dominion Rubber 498 Nov. 23 80,000* 10,000 8/0 5,8341(rubber footware) 1953
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Table 3 (continued)
Case
Firestone Tire & Rubber(rubber tires)
Howard Smith (fine papers)
Crown Zellerbach
R. v. Morrey et al. (Retail Merchan
Assoc. of Canada)
John W. Fogg Ltd. (Timmins Coa
Northern Electric (cable)
Dominion Steel & Coal(wire fencing)
Quilting Case
D.E. Adams(Winnipeg Coal Case)
Link Belt Limited(conveyor equipment)
Johns Manville(asphalt roofing)
R. v. Gair et al. and R. v. Bathurst
and Paper et al. (boxboard case)
Armco (metal culverts)
Abitibi (pulpwood)
Electrical Contractors Assoc. of
Ontario
R. v. C. W.Dent
Coal - Sault Ste. Marie
Eastern Sugar
Belt Mfg. Assoc. of Montreal










498 Nov. 23 90,000*
1953
498 June 22 242,000*
1954
498 May 6 58,000'
1955
I2(l) (c) Oct24 1.00(d), (e) 1955
al) 498 Mar. 13 3,6500
1956
498 Apr. 30 82,000*
1956
498 May 23 60,000*
1956
498 Oct. 3 6,000*
1957
498 Nov. 12 20,000*
1957
498 Nov. 22 52,0000
1957
498 San. 7 110,000'
1958
Pulp 498 Nov. 10 65,000*
1958
411 Nov. 13 65,000'
1959
498 Jun 15 240,000
(1) (d) 1960
498 Jun. 15 7,500*
(1)(d) 1960
411 Nov. 28 7,500*
(1) (d) 1961
411 Sept. 6 15,000'
(1) (d) 1961
498 Mar. 18 75,000*
(1) (d) 1963
411 Sept 16 300*
(1) (d) 1963
32(1) (c) Nov. 27 3,000'
1964
32(1) (c) Mar. 28 16,000'
1966
32(1) (c) Sep. 20 1,000'
1966
32(1) (c) Sept 15 13,500
1966
498(1) (d) Nov. 24 391,500'
1966
32(l) (c) Mar. 9 17,5000
1967



































































































Lathing & Plastering (Toronto)
B.C. Pharmacists
Toronto Ready Mix Concrete
Quebec Tavern Keepers
Ocean Const. SuppliesO(Vancouver, ready mix)
Victoria, (ready mix)
B.C. cement
Toronto Lumber dealers (Alpa)
Armco (metal culverts)
Newfoundland Auto Parts
Nova Scotia Fire Insurance





32(l) (c) Nov. 20 98,500*
1967
32(1) (a) Apr. 1 20,000*
32(1) (c) 1968




32(1)(c) Oct. 18 32.300*
1968
32(1)(c) Oct. 18 25,0000
1968
32(1) (c) June. 3 15.800
1969
32(1)(c) Sept 8 20,000*
32(1)(d) 1969
32(1)(c) Nov. 20 75,000*
32(1)(d) 1969
32(1)(c) Nov. 27 10,000
32(1)(d) 1970
32(I)(c) Apr. 17 245,000'
1972








32(1) (c) Sept. 25 447,000'1974
32(1) (c) June16 32,000*
1975














































73/0 41,2123(to Nov. 30/75
only)
Notes
I Includes legal fees, witness fees, court reporters fees, disbursements, and travel
for non-permanent staff for prosecution only, not investigation.
2 Same as 1 but also includes travel expenses of regular employees of Director of
Investigation and research.
3 Includes professional fees and expenses and travel expenses of regular employees.
n.a. - Data not available.
Justice - Prosecution handled by Department of Justice, no data available.
4 Includes trade associations.
5 Includes two partnerships and one individual.
6 Counted as one case involving six separate companies.
* Order of Prohibition also issued.
SouRcn: Data provided by Miss B. Dench, Bureau of Competition Policy, Department
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Ottawa.
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Table 4
Size of Fines in Merger and Monopoly
Cases, Combines Investigation Act
No. of Cost of
Total Largest Firms Prosecu-
Section Date1 Fine Fine Convicted tion
R. v. Eddy 2(4) and 32 Oct. 29,
Match et al. (monopoly) 1951 $85,000 $25,000
1 merger &
2 monopoly








I Date of trial judgment or sentence. There were no successful prosecutions before
1951.2 Order of Prohibition issued.







Average Fine per Firm in Combines Cases
1889-1975
Merger & Resale Price
Period, cases Conspiracy Cases Monopoly Maintenance
dated by date Cases Cases4

















































































1 In one case, R. v. C. W. Dent, the individual was fined $7,500.
2 Includes the Nova Scotia fire insurance case in which 73 firms were fined a total
of $340,700. This case is under appeal to the Supreme Court.
3 Three cases involved, both individuals and firms.
4 Includes refusal to supply cases.
5 In both the Canadian Breweries and B.C. Sugar cases, decided in 1960, the ac-
cused were acquitted.
6 Includes a number of trade associations; 1889-1910(1), 1926-1942(2), 1950-
1959(1), 1960-1969(2), 1970-1975(2).
7 Three partnerships involving 10 persons were counted as three individuals.
8 If we eliminate the Armco case the average falls to $10,654. If we eliminate the
B.C. cement case it falls to $10,693, and if both are removed from the calculation
the average fine is $8,149.
9 Includes K. C. Irving case under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, four
firms fined $150,000.
10 Calculations include one individual in each period 1950-1959, 1960-1969 and
1970-1975.
31To July 10, 1975. If the two cases involving fines of $10,000 and the two result-
ing in fines of $15,000 each are excluded, the average falls to $2,438.
12 In the B.C. cement case there were three separate indictments involving seven
legal entities. One company was the same firm under a different name due to corporate
reorganization. One company was charged in all three indictments. This has been
counted as one case involving six firms.
Sotrcns: Reported and unreported judgments and unpublished data provided by Miss B.
Dench, Bureau of Competition Policy, Dept. of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs, Ottawa.
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Table 6
RPM/Refusal to Supply Cases: Fines Imposed 1954 to 1975
No. of
Firms/ Costs of
Date Fine Total Indiv. Prosecu-

































Black & Decker (power tools)
C. E. Springer (dist. of
Rubbermaid products)
Burlington Ind. (pantyhose)
A. T. Radies (carpet sweepers)
Kito Canada (carpet sweepers)
Notes
34 Nov. 18/54 $ 5.00 0/1 $ 376'
34 Nov. 17/54 1,000 1/0 1,2881
34 Sept. 21/56 500* 1/0 8,2072
34(2) (b)
34(3) (b) (i) Nov. 21/62 1,500 1/0 4,1802
34 (2) (b) May 25/64 300 0/1 11,4842
34(2) (b) Mar. 18/66 2,000* 1/0 22,2782
34(2) (a) Sept. 26/66 1,000* 1/0 See below-
34(2) (a) Oct. 17/66 500 1/0 7,3292
34(3)(b) (i)
34(2) (a) Jan. 29/68 500 1/0
34(2) (a) " 500 1/0 29,7742<-
343 a2 (I) 6,000 1/0
34(2) (b) Jan. 28/69 1,200* 1/0 Justice
34(2)()
34(3)(b)(i) June 19169 2,800' 1/0 Justice
34(2) (b) Aug. 27/69 750* 1/0 631'
34(2( a)
34(3)a (i) May 1/70 1,000' 1/0 Justice
34(2) (a) March 2/72 2,000* 1/0 Justice
38(2) (a) June 21/72 1,500 1/0 1,388'
34(2) (a) Dec. 6/72 3,250 1/0 Justice
38(2) (a) April 19/73 1,500' 1/0 Justice
38(2) (b) Sept. 19/73 10,000*0 1/0 Justice
38(3) (b) (i) May 3/74 1,000 1/0 Justice
38(2) (a) Oct. 7/74 3,000' 1/0
38(3)a (i) n.a.
38(2) (a) Oct. 15/74 15,000* 1/0 Justice
34f2f Sept. 24/74 15,000* 1/0 2,493' 1 (a)
38(2) Dec. 16/74 4,000* 1/0 Justice
38(2) (b)
38(2)(b) (I) Dcc. 17/74 10,00O* 1/0 Justice
38(2) (a) April 18/75 3,000' 1/0 n.a.
38(3) (b) (i) June 16/75 2,000 1/0 n.a.
38(2) April 15/75 1,000* 0/1 } Justice
38(2) July 10/75 6,000'" 1/0
* Order of Prohibition also imposed.
Qincreased from $2,500 on appeal.
0 Reduced on appeal from $60,000 for four counts.
For definitions of 1, 2, 3 see Table 3; Justice = handled by Dept. of Justice staff.
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Table 8
Disposition of Misleading Advertising Cases
Calendar 1973 and 1974
Section 36 Section 37
1973 1974 1973 1974
Charges Laid 26 40 69 102
Acquittals 6 10 15 30
Convictions 20 30 54 72
Average Fine - per case' $ 229 $ 262 $ 1,3472 $ 1,160
Average Fine/All counts $ 191 $ 207 $ 8362 $ 739
Average Fine/i st count only
-corporations $ 247 $ 293 $ 888 $ 1,124
- individuals $ 44 $ 212 $ 532 $ 316
-both $ 2043 $ 2424 $ 7115 $ 8906
Total Fines in the Year $4,575 $7,852 $72,725 $83,525
Prohibition Orders 2 2 11 5
Other (jail only, discharge,
restitution) - 3 - 3
Notes
1 Incorporates multiple counts and both individuals and corporations.
2 In the Benson & Hedges case the firm was fined $2,500 on the first count and
$25,000 on the second.
3Based on 19 first count convictions.
4 In 3 cases sentences were suspended, hence there were no fines.
5Fines imposed in lump sum against 4 accused have been averaged to determine
fines by count. i.e. $500 total on 4 counts has been treated as $125 fine 1st count, etc.
GBased on 69 first count convictions in three of which no fine was imposed.
SouncE: Ms. Tandy Muir-Warden, Bureau of Competition Policy, Dept. of Consumer
and Corporate Affairs, Ottawa.




Consumer Price Wholesale Price
Index Index













June 1975 178.2 483.9
Souens:- Richard M. Bird, The Growth of Government Spending in Canada, (Toron-
to: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1970) Table 58, Appendix C.
-Statistics Canada, Canadian Statistical Review, Cat. No. 11003, February,
1976.
G. POSTSCRIPT
On November 16, 1976 the Supreme Court of Canada, in a unanimous
decision written by Chief Justice Bora Laskin, upheld the decision of the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal which acquitted K. C. Irving Ltd. et al. of several
counts of merger and monopoly violations of the Combines Investigation
Act.268 The essence of the decision was that while the Irving interest's owner-
ship of all five English-language daily newspapers in New Brunswick amount-
ed to monopoly control, the Crown had not established that the monopoly
had been operated "to the detriment or against the interest of the public..."
Consequently the entry for R. v. K. C. Irving in Table 4 should be deleted
and in Table 5 the entry for the period 1970-1975 in the "Merger and
Monopoly" column should be changed to $40,000 for one case and one firm
(the ERCO case). This decision along with the acquittal in R. v. Allied
Chemical269 (in which leave to appeal was denied) and the acquittal on the
monopoly charge of Canadian General Electric, Westinghouse and GTE-
Sylvania in the large lamp case270 all point to the necessity to reform Canadian
competition policy as it relates to the monopoly/dominant firm problem.
Much rides on the effectiveness of the Stage II amendments to the Combines
Investigation Act expected in December 1976.
2 68 As yet unreported.
269 Supra, note 44.
2 7 0 R. v. Canadian General Electric Company et al., supra, note 45.
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